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In  1993, in the White Paper "Growth, competitiveness, employment", the European Commission 
referred for the first time to the services voucher and to the potential of  job creation connected with 
the development of  the neighbourhood services. 
During the last two years, these proposals were specified and were consolidated in various studies 
and official documents, at Community level. They thus contributed to developing a debate on new 
economic and social policy measures in the Member States. As  these suggestions meet a broader 
audience, including public opinion, and give place to concrete experiments, it becomes pressing to 
acknowledge the perspectives and the mechanisms brought into play. 
The seminar organized in Brussels, on 15 May 1996 by DG V and the Forward Studies Unit, aimed, 
therefore,  to  bring  together  some  research  workers  and  national  officials  in  charge  of the 
employment policies to exchange information on the existing or future measures of their economic 
and social effects and to evaluate their overall coherence. 
Presentations  1  followed the order of the classification proposed by the introductory report of the 
CERISIS-UCL, which stressed the aim pursued by the measure, namely the quality of life, the job 
creation or the"social management"  of unemployment. Without being exhaustive, this seminar made 
it possible to produce a rather broad review of  the current questions and to study in greater detail the 
conditions of strengthened effectiveness of the  subsidies to consumption, aimed at improving the 
quality of  life of  the Europeans on the one hand and creating new jobs on the other hand. 
1  All the participants expressed themselves individually. 
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8 I.  INTRODUCTORY REPORT 
CONSUMPTION SUBSIDIES FOR LOCAL SERVICES 
BRUNO GILAIN, MARTHE NYSSENS AND FRANCESCA PETRELLA- CERISIS - CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF 
LOUV  AIN-LA-NEUVE (UCL) 
Introduction 
Local  services  cover a  vast range of activities  which can be  grouped,  according to  the  European 
Commission's proposal2, under the following headings: day-to-day services (help for the elderly, child 
care, home help services, etc.), services to improve living conditions (such as housing improvements 
and the upgrading of urban areas), cultural and leisure services and environmental services (including 
waste management and recycling). 
Demographic, socio-cultural and economic changes, such as population ageing, the massive influx of 
women into the labour market, changes in consumption patterns, the decline of certain districts, etc., 
have meant that the demand for these services is now growing or diversifying. 
Local service development is currently faced, however, with a number of  obstacles relating both to the 
supply which is still not very structured in some sectors and the demand which is not effective because 
the cost of  these services is too high. It is therefore important to devise measures that help to create an 
effective demand and to structure the supply. This raises two questions: 
By what criteria can public intervention in the development of  these services be justified? 
What system(s) need(s) to be established? 
Two types of consideration can be put forward at this point. On the one hand, public authority action 
can be based on the concern to satisfy a demand connected with quality of life and considered by the 
community to reflect important needs. In this way, society can guarantee equitable access to services 
and ensure a structured and high-quality supply. On the other hand, public intervention may be justified 
in order to exploit the potential for the integration of  the unemployed and/or job creation, in particular 
for workers with few skills, represented by some local services. 
From this point of  view, it is important to evaluate which subsidy mechanisms will best help to develop 
the  supply  and  create  an  effective  demand  for  these  services.  Two  types  of mechanism  can be 
envisaged: consumption subsidies and production subsidies. 
A grid for the analysis of the various consumption subsidy formulae that exist or are planned in a 
number of EU Member States is put forward in this report. We have taken as our starting point the 
questionnaire sent to those taking part in the seminar held on 15 May 1996 in Brussels (see Annexes). 
The aim of this seminar was to  improve our knowledge of existing consumption subsidy initiatives 
through an exchange of  information between the different countries3. 
2  For a description of the various fields of service activity, see the Commission's report SEC (95) 564, "Local 
development and employment initiatives, Survey in the European Union", 1995. 
3  We should like to  take this  opportunity to  thank Marjorie Jouen of the Forward Planning Unit and Jean-
Franyois Lebrun of  DG V for their valuable advice on this report. 
9 We feel that it is important in the first instance to clarify what is meant by consumption and production 
subsidies, even though this report deals chiefly with consumption subsidies. Part 1 therefore examines 
the  differences  between  these  two  types  of subsidy.  In  Part  2,  we  put  forward  a  typology  of 
consumption subsidies based on the type of service to which they relate and the objectives that they 
pursue. Part 3 reviews the various methods that can be used for consumption subsidies, i.e. targeting, 
the form of  the subsidy, the distribution method, the level of  regulation and back-up measures, thereby 
taking up the various issues explored in the questionnaire. Part 4 analyses the role of these methods 
against six evaluation criteria which can be linked to objectives. It is then possible to identify a set of 
methods that are preferable from the point of  view of  the main objective pursued by the subsidy and the 
type of service to which it relates. Part 5 summarises this information in the form of synoptic tables. 
These make  it possible  to  evaluate  consumption  subsidies  from  the  point of view of consistency 
between the methods used, the type of  service involved and the objectives pursued. In the final part, we 
conclude by proposing two transverse questions that place this thinking in the broader perspective of 
local service development and choices of  methods of  public intervention. 
1.1  What do we mean by production and consumption subsidies? 
As mentioned above, two types of  measure can be envisaged to promote the development of emerging 
services, involving support for the supply and the creation of  an effective demand: production subsidies 
and consumption subsidies. 
Production subsidies reduce the  cost of producing the  service by reducing the  cost of labour (for 
instance by reductions of  or exemptions from social security contributions), reducing the cost of  capital 
(for instance by exempting costs connected with the initial investment from taxation) and/or partially 
offsetting the operating costs of  the service. Subsidies reducing the cost of  labour may be targeted on a 
type of  labour (for instance exemption from social security contributions in the case of low wages), on 
a  specific  sector  (such  as  the  non-commercial  sector)  or  may  be  part  of a  policy  to  reduce 
unemployment (for instance the partial funding of  jobs for the long-term unemployed). These subsidies 
may lead to a reduction of  the price of  the service, thereby promoting consumption. They may also be 
used to increase profits or improve the quality of the service. The impact of subsidies of this kind is 
therefore likely to depend on the conditions attached to their payment. Some production subsidies are 
calculated on the basis of an annual forecast of consumption of the service (child care services, for 
instance). In this case, they are similar to consumption subsidies. 
Consumption  subsidies  promote  an  increase  in  the  consumption of specific  goods  or services  by 
increasing consumers' purchasing power or by reducing the price of these goods and services. This 
means that the price set by service providers, which covers all their costs, is not the price actually paid 
by consumers who make use of the subsidy. This type of subsidy has the advantage, therefore, that it 
does not interfere with the way in which the supply is structured. Leaving aside this aspect, one of the 
main features of consumption subsidies is that they are consumer-led, in the sense that consumers are 
free  to  choose  the  service  provider  who  offers  the  service  at  the  best  quality/price  ratio.  This 
mechanism  therefore  steps  up  competition  among  service  providers.  The  different  forms  that 
consumption subsidies can take are examined in Section 3.2. 
The relative advantages and drawbacks of  each type of subsidy need to be discussed in detail before a 
choice is made. The following analysis relates exclusively, however, to consumption subsidies. The 
importance of these discussions is taken up again, however, in the context of a transverse question in 
the final part of  this report, where an initial comparison grid is given for this purpose. 
10 1.2  Typology of  consumption subsidies 
The various types of consumption subsidy can be defined in terms of the objectives that they pursue, 
the type of  service to which they relate and the public or private nature of  the promoter of  the scheme. 
l2.1  Type of  service 
The choice of a consumption subsidy is not without links with the  type of service covered by the 
scheme. Consumption subsidies are linked to personal services for which needs remain unmet, among 
other things because there is not an effective enough demand. 
At present, most consumption subsidies are linked to day-to-day services. Consumption subsidies could 
also be envisaged in other service areas, for instance in cultural and leisure services4. 
Day-to-day services can be divided into two types of  service, i.e.: 
•  personal services, i.e. services meeting needs shaped by family circumstances (home helps and 
child care) and/or dependency (the elderly, sick or those unable to care for themselves); 
•  household services, i.e.  all those services which make daily life easier (housework, ironing, 
small electrical or plumbing repairs, home shopping, gardening, etc.). These services may be 
provided at home or at the workplace (for instance ironing services for workers). 
The main difference between these services lies in the importance that is attached to the relationship 
between the provider and the  user.  In the  case of personal services,  this relationship is decisive in 
determining the quality of  the service. This same does not apply to household services. 
l2.2  Objectives 
Consumption  subsidies  may  be  introduced  to  achieve  a  whole  range  of objectives.  While  these 
objectives  can be  grouped  under  two  main  headings,  both  may be  involved  simultaneously.  Our 
hypothesis in this case is that one takes priority. These two objectives are: 
•  Improving the quality of  life (quality of  life objective) 
Local services need to be developed and consolidated, in terms of  both quantity and quality, to meet the 
increased or diversified demand resulting from social change. The objective of  improving the quality of 
life  may,  for  instance,  involve  creating  an  effective  demand,  diversifying  service  providers  or 
simplifying administrative formalities so that these services are easier to obtain, etc. 
We have linked the following evaluation criteria with this objective: equal access to the service, quality 
of  the service, coverage of  needs and structuring of  the supply. The importance of  these criteria can be 
assessed on a case by case basis. 
•  Promoting employment (employment objective) 
In the light of increasing unemployment, which has hit people with few skills particularly hard, local 
services seem to offer considerable potential for new jobs. Two policy strands can be pinpointed within 
measures to promote employment: the first promoting the creation of durable jobs under ordinary law 
4  The  Spanish Inserso  programme is  an example of a subsidy  intended to  develop  low-season tourism for 
elderly people. In France, the cheque-vacances (holiday voucher) is also a subsidy intended to develop social 
tourism. 
12 and the second connected with the social management of unemployment. Integration policies which 
help unemployed people ultimately to find durable jobs come within the first strand. The second strand 
includes policies which simply aim to provide the unemployed with some kind of  "occupation" without 
changing their status5. The first strand has the objective of  job creation and the second the objective of 
social management of  unemployment. 
Reducing undeclared work or making recruitment easier by simplifying administrative formalities are 
also concerns to be found in this context. 
Quantitative and qualitative evaluation criteria relating to the jobs or occupational activities created are 
linked to this objective. 
Curbing or reducing public expenditure may be a further explicit objective. In practice, this objective 
rarely appears on its  own.  It is  more usual  for  subsidies intended to  diversify the  supply of local 
services and to step up  competition among service providers to have the simultaneous objective of 
improving the quality of  life, by increasing the consumer's choice, and of  curbing public expenditure in 
this field. In some cases, the social management of  unemployment objective also goes together with an 
attempt  to  rationalise  unemployment  benefit  expenditure;  the  benefits  are  paid  provided  that 
unemployed people are willing to accept the "occupations" that they are offered. Outside these typical 
cases, the balance of  public finances is generally a constraint that has to be respected in the context of 
both the improvement of  the quality of  life and the promotion of  employment. For this reason and so as 
not to overcomplicate our analysis, we  shall not consider the balance of public finances  as  a third 
objective but as  a  constraint to  be taken into  account in the  evaluation of consumption  subsidies 
whether the  objective that they are  pursuing is  one  of improving the  quality of life  or promoting 
employment. 
Consumption subsidies can be classified initially on the basis of  the type of  service to which they relate 
(i.e. targeting on the service) and the objectives pursued by their introduction. The same measure may 
be included in several boxes, in cases where the subsidy relates to both types of  service or pursues both 
objectives simultaneously. 
Table 1:  An initial classification of  subsidies 
Personal services  Household services 




- social management of 
unemployment 
!2.3  Nature of  the promoter 
A third factor needs, however, to be taken into account in our classification of the different types of 
subsidy: the private or public status of the promoter of the consumption subsidy. In the first case, the 
promoter may be a profit-making or non-profit-making private organisation (enterprise or association). 
The second case includes all public authorities at national and local level. 
5  This strand leads in some cases to the creation of  a "secondary labour market" (see below). 
13 This  raises  the  question  of the  correlations  that  exist between  the  types  of service  promoted,  the 
objective pursued and the status of  the promoter. 
14 Table 2:  Private promoters 
Personal services  Household services 
Quality of  life objective  Cheque-Prestation (France) 
Employment objective:  Titre-emploi-service (France)  Titre-emploi-service (France) 
-job creation  Ironing voucher (Belgian project) 
-social management of 
unemployment 
In the case of  private promoters, the employment objective is linked chiefly to subsidies for household 
services; the enterprise may wish to create employment for people with few skills in activities that are 
of  benefit to the enterprise or its employees. This may explain why such initiatives are concentrated in 
the household service area,  bearing in mind that household services require lower-level  skills than 
personal services. 
In the area of the improvement of the quality of life, the measures set up by private promoters may 
include both household and personal services. The motivations for this may vary: making employees 
more available for work, improving the enterprise's image, improving customer loyalty and attracting 
new customers, simplifying formalities so that the service can be more readily obtained, etc. 
Private promoters may be in one of  three situations - which undoubtedly have an impact on the subsidy 
promoter's motivations:  either the  promoter is  also  the  service  provider,  or he  accredits  providers 
eligible for the subsidy or he is not the provider and sets no criteria for the choice of  the provider (the 
promoter may for instance be no more than the issuer of  a service voucher). 
Table 3:  Public promoters 
Personal services  Household services 
Quality of  life objective  Dependency insurance (Germany); 
Dependent persons and child care 
vouchers (Finland); 
Child care vouchers (United Kingdom) 
Employment objective:  Cheque-emploi-service* (France)  Cheque-emploi-service* (France); 
-job creation  Home Service Scheme (Denmark) 
~------------------~--------------------~-------------------
- social management of  Cheque-ALE* (Belgium)  Cheque-ALE* (Belgium) 
unemployment 
*  These  "multi-service"  formulae  are  included  in  both  columns.  In  practice,  however,  the 
demand is almost entirely (80%) for household services (see page 27). 
When the public authorities are promoters of consumption subsidies, most such measures linked to the 
employment promotion objective are introduced in the household service area, whether the aim is job 
creation, as in the case of  the French Cheque-Emploi-Service and the Danish Home Service scheme, or 
the social management of unemployment,  as  in the  case of the Belgian Cheque-ALE.  The Belgian 
Cheque-ALE, like the French Cheque-Emploi-Service, may also cover personal services (in particular 
child care) which may be somewhat risky as there is no guarantee of the quality of the service and 
15 equity is not a consideration (the price of the service is the same for all users and the tax allowances 
granted to users favour people on high incomes). 
The public authorities may also offer subsidies intended to improve the quality of  life. This objective is 
chiefly linked to personal services where the quality of  life concern is, among other things, to provide 
everyone with more equitable access to these services and to guarantee the quality of the service on 
offer. 
Consumption subsidies which are also linked to an explicit objective of  curbing public expenditure are 
to be found in this context. This is true, for instance, of  the Finnish service voucher schemes. 
From a more dynamic point of view, it is important to see how schemes can evolve over time. The 
private sector can, in some cases, help to reveal a new or badly satisfied demand for needs that society 
considers important with the result that the private initiative is supported or supplemented by public 
intervention. In other cases, the public authorities may encourage the private sector to contribute to the 
development of  local services. In France, for instance, the Law of  29 January 1996 on the development 
of personal service jobs encourages enterprises to assist employees who recruit providers of home 
services by issuing them with vouchers called titres-emploi-service.  This assistance is  exempt from 
employers'  and  employees'  social  security  contributions.  Some  services  could well  be  subsidised, 
therefore, by partnerships between the public and private sectors. 
1.3  Description of  different consumption subsidy methods 
The various methods that can be used for consumption subsidies, as set out in the questionnaire (see 
Annex 1  ),  are reviewed in this section. These methods will be analysed against a set of criteria in the 
following section. 
I3.1  Targeting 
I.3 .1.1  The service 
The consumption subsidy may be targeted on a particular type of  service - as for instance in the British 
system of care vouchers for  four-year-old children or in the  Danish case where the  subsidy relates 
solely to household services - or may cover a wide range of  services. A multi-service voucher system, 
such as the Belgian Cheque-ALE, is an example of  this second option. As discussed in Section 1, most 
measures are targeted, however, on a particular type of  service. 
I.3 .1.2  The provider 
Targeting on providers may relate, on the one hand, to the type of organisation and, on the other hand, 
to the type of worker.  From the point of view of the type of organisation, providers may be self-
employed or employees. Various types of  organisation may be targeted by the subsidy: public or State-
controlled  organisations,  private  enterprises  or  social  economy  organisations  (associations,  mutual 
societies or cooperatives). 
From the point of  view of the type of  worker, the consumption subsidy may be conditional on the use 
of  a particular socio-occupational group of  providers. In the context of  a policy to fight unemployment, 
for instance, the subsidy may be targeted on the long-term unemployed, as in the Belgian ALE system. 
16 1.3 .1.3  The consumer2 
Targeting on a group of consumers is often linked to the type of service. This is particularly true of 
services for the elderly and child care services. Targeting on the consumer may go together with more 
explicit criteria such as intensity of  need (i.e. number of  dependent children, degree of dependency) or 
income level (i.e. subsidies that decrease as income increases). 
I3.2  Subsidy mechanisms 
1.3 .2.1  The bud~etary framework 
The subsidy may form  part of the  system of welfare allowances  (family,  health,  unemployment or 
pension  benefits),  wage  policy,  taxation  policy  or  may  be  a  private  scheme  (in  an  enterprise,  a 
foundation,  an  association,  etc.).  The  choice  of the  budgetary  framework  may  be  shaped by the 
objectives  pursued  and  the  service  involved  - as  in  the  case  of dependency  insurance  - and  by 
considerations  of political  feasibility.  In  the  current  climate,  additional  tax  allowances  seem,  for 
instance,  more  acceptable  than  direct  increases  in  welfare  expenditure.  Dependency  insurance  in 
Germany  involves  a direct  increase  in  social  security  expenditure  (financed  from  increased  social 
security  contributions)  whereas  the  establishment  of a  service  voucher  accompanied  by  a  tax 
allowance, as in the case of the cheque-emploi-service in France, leads to a decrease in revenue from 
taxation. Bearing in mind the budgetary constraints that obtain in different countries,  the  choice of 
further  expenditure  or reduced  revenue  will  have  an  impact  on  the  political  acceptability  of the 
proposed subsidy, although these two budget allocations may well have the same impact on public 
finances in the long run. 
1.3.2.2  Ex ante or ex post subsidies 
The basis on which the consumer receives the consumption subsidy may be ex ante, i.e. in advance or 
at the time of  purchase, or ex post, via a refund mechanism. In the case of an ex ante subsidy for the 
consumer, who does not therefore pay the full  price, the provider may receive the remainder of the 
price when the  service is provided, i.e.  ex ante  (in the case,  for  instance, of payment by a voucher 
corresponding to  the  full  price of the  service but purchased at half price by the  consumer),  or be 
reimbursed subsequently after proving that the service has been provided (ex post). The Danish Home 
Service Scheme is based, for instance, on an ex ante subsidy for the consumer and an ex post subsidy 
for the provider. 
1.3 .2.3  Fixed subsidies or subsidies varyin~ on the basis of  income and/or need 
The consumption subsidy may be fixed or variable. One of the advantages of this kind of subsidy is 
that it can be adjusted to take account of  income and/or need. Dependency insurance in Germany is an 
example of a subsidy that varies according to need. In Finland, most local authorities have chosen to 
link the  child  care  subsidy  to  the  level  of income.  Under the  British child care  voucher  system, 
however, the subsidy is fixed. 
1.3.2.4  Subsidies in the form of  benefits in kind or in cash 
6  In this report, we have used the term consumer (or in some cases  user)  in place of the term recipient of 
services used in the questionnaire, in order to avoid any confusion between the recipients of  the subsidy (who 
may be service providers) and the recipients of services. It should be noted, however, that the term consumer 
is  in some cases restrictive  as  it does  not make it possible correctly to  designate recipients  (or users) of 
services who play an active part in designing these services in cooperation with providers. 
17 A  subsidy that takes  the  form  of a benefit in  kind  is  a  subsidy  which  can be  used  only  for  the 
consumption of a specific type of service. In some cases, the benefit in kind is for a specific type of 
service which is also provided by a specific type of  provider  7. 
In contrast, a subsidy that is not subject to strict conditions on the consumption of  particular services is 
a  cash benefit.  This method is  connected with targeting on  a  larger or  smaller range  of services. 
Granting an annual child care allowance to all households with children increases the purchasing power 
of households  but does  not guarantee  that households  will  make  use  of child  care  services.  It is 
therefore a cash benefit. If, however, the subsidy can be obtained only by using a child care service, it 
is a benefit in kind. The German dependency insurance system offers the choice between a subsidy in 
kind and a cash payment with most people opting for the latter. 
I3.3  Distribution methods 
1.3.3. 1  Individual or collective distribution methods 
The way in which the formula is distributed may be individual or collective. A collective distribution 
method is involved when it has already been decided to earmark a proportion of available income for 
the consumption of services when this income becomes available, whether by remuneration or social 
security transfer (Saintrain &  Streel,  1996, 32).  Collective distribution is  not the same as  automatic 
distributionS.  For instance,  the  allocation of a pay increase  for  the  consumption of services  under 
collective bargaining may be imposed on workers (automatic distribution) or left to their discretion 
(voluntary  distribution).  In  the  case  of voluntary  distribution,  the  worker  can  choose  to  take  this 
increase in the form of  cash with no additional subsidy or in the form of  a service voucher whose value 
is greater than the cash amount. The German dependency insurance system is, however, an example of 
collective distribution which is financed from the automatic allocation of  a proportion of  pay. 
1.3 .3 .2  Paying subsidies in cash or via another medium 
The consumption subsidy may be paid using a medium such as a service voucher. Another solution is 
to pay an allowance in cash without using a particular medium. 
It may be useful to pay the consumption subsidy using some kind of  medium when it is accompanied 
by other methods to increase demand (simplification of administrative formalities, monitoring of the 
quality of  the service, etc.), as in the case of  the French cheque-emploi-service. 
I3.4  Regulation 
Regulation covers all those regulations and measures that back up  the  subsidy methods so  that the 
planned objectives can be achieved. 
I3.5  Supporting measures 
Various back-up measures can be introduced when it is decided to establish a subsidy. They may relate 
to  the  training  of providers,  mediation  between  supply  and  demand,  support  for  new  project 
development, etc. The importance of  these measures will vary depending on the objectives and the type 
of  service involved. 
7  See Floc'hic, 0., (1995). 
8  The term "automatic" refers to compulsory distribution, as mentioned in the questionnaire. 
18 1.4  Analysis of methods 
Six criteria for evaluating the methods connected with these subsidies are put forward in this section; 
they relate to the objectives pursued. We shall  see in the following  section that the type of service 
involved shapes the importance to be attached to each criterion. 
The evaluation criteria are as follows: 
In connection with the quality of  life objective: 
•  equity; 
•  quality of  the service; 
•  structuring of  the supply; 
•  budget constraints. 
In connection with the employment promotion objective: 
•  quantitative effects in terms of  jobs or the social management of  unemployment; 
qualitative effects in terms of  jobs or the social management of  unemployment; 
•  budget constraints. 
1.4.1  Factors relating to the quality of  life 
!.4.1.1  Equity 
The criterion of  equity covers the objectives of opening up access to the service and of  redistribution. 
Several ways of  achieving this objective can be envisaged: 
the form of  the subsidy: 
•  adjustment  of the  subsidy  on  the  basis  of income  and/or  need:  the  subsidy  may 
decrease as  income increases or increase according to need, in order to ensure that 
everyone has equal access to the services involved. A subsidy that varies according to 
the intensity of need makes it possible, for  instance, to  curb any creaming off (i.e. 
when providers disregard those with the greatest needs in favour of people requiring 
less demanding services). 
•  ex ante or ex post subsidy from the point of  view of  the consumer: an ex ante subsidy 
has the advantage that it is received immediately whereas an ex post subsidy has to be 
paid in advance by the consumer which may discourage people on low incomes; an ex 
ante subsidy can be obtained even by people who do not pay tax which is not the case 
with ex post subsidies that take the form of tax allowances. An ex post subsidy may, 
however, take the form of  a non-wastable credit, i.e. a tax credit paid in cash to people 
whose tax is zero or too low to benefit fully from the tax allowance. 
•  subsidy in kind or in cash: the advantage of  a subsidy in kind is that it ensures that the 
subsidy cannot be used for  purposes  other than the  consumption of the  service to 
which it relates.  From the  point of view of equal  access  to  services  that  society 
considers  important this  formula  makes  it possible  to  target the  subsidy  on  those 
19 beneficiaries for whom it is wished to guarantee the service. In this case, the subsidy 
could for instance be granted in the form of a personal, non-exchangeable voucher 
which can be used only for a specific service (service vouchers for home care for the 
elderly). The opposite to this would be an open, transferable voucher covering a wide 
range of  services (for instance the Belgian luncheon voucher). 
the distribution method: 
•  an automatic allocation of income for the consumption of some services felt  to be 
indispensable by the community could be introduced by making access to this service 
a universal right of every citizen (as in the case of German dependency insurance or 
the French independence benefit). The measure is then part of  national solidarity. The 
choice of an automatic income allocation could also be justified by the concern to 
prevent irresponsible individuals or those with financial problems from choosing to 
receive their income supplement in the form of cash and using it for purposes other 
than the needs which it is intended to meet. As a way of guaranteeing children's rights, 
it could, for instance, be envisaged for an increase in family allowances to take the 
form  solely  of  a  service  voucher  giving  access  to  high-quality  child  care 
establishments. 
regulation: 
•  from the point of  view of equity, it is important to adopt regulations to guarantee the 
same quality of  service for everyone, if the subsidy methods chosen do not guarantee 
this. 
•  similarly, it may be necessary to adopt regulations to prevent creaming-off risks, for 
instance in cases where the subsidy takes no account of  the intensity of  need (as in the 
case of  the British service vouchers). 
1.4.1.2  Quality of  the service 
In order to ensure the quality of the service - from the point of view of  both the service itself and the 
relationship that it entails - and to increase consumer confidence, several factors need to be taken into 
account: 
the formulation of  accreditation criteria which take account of: 
•  providers' qualifications; 
•  quality standards for the service. 
the use of  employer organisations rather than self-employed workers: placing service providers 
within  an  organisation  offers  guarantees  of supervision  and  control  by the  organisation, 
possibilities of continuing training and increased consumer protection since it is  easier for 
consumers to take complaints to an organisation. 
the establishment of  intermediate facilities for training, information and quality control. 
This makes  it possible  to  target particular types  of provider,  for  instance  accredited providers  or 
organisations. 
1.4.1.3  Structuring the supply 
Over and above the quality of  the service itself, the quality of  the supply may be shaped by a number of 
factors: 
20 •  the choice offered to  consumers: if a range of providers is available, a wide-ranging demand 
for services can be met; 
•  managing a plurality of  providers:  the  coexistence  of various  types  of provider  (private 
enterprises, associations, public or State-controlled bodies) can be promoted in various ways; 
these  include,  for  instance,  credit facilities  for  associations  or harmonised taxation  for  all 
providers; 
•  the establishment of  intermediate facilities making it easier to match the supply to the diversity 
of  the demand, in particular from the point of  view of  local situations. 
I.4.1.4  Budget constraints 
From the point of  view of improving the quality of life, the budget constraint criterion covers both the 
issue of finding out whether the methods selected are likely to keep the budget balanced and whether 
they allow for the long-term coverage of  needs: 
•  the source of funding chosen for the subsidy has an impact on the possibility of its long-term 
extension.  From  this  point  of view,  and  bearing  in  mind  the  current  climate  of public 
expenditure cuts, it is possible to envisage innovative funding formulae which,  for instance, 
combine several sources of  funds from both the public and private sectors (such as the creation 
of  a fund financed by enterprises and the State in order to finance child care facilities); 
•  it is important to find out whether the scheme makes it possible to determine the overall cost of 
the subsidy in advance. When this is not possible, in the case, for instance, of a subsidy in the 
form of a tax allowance, the possibility of  maintaining the balance of  public finances becomes 
somewhat uncertain. 
I4.2  Factors relating to employment promotion 
In a policy to promote employment, various methods may influence the impact of the subsidy on the 
quantity and quality of  employment. 
1.4.2.1  Quantitative effects 
If the consumption subsidy is to have a maximum impact on employment, it is important to choose 
subsidy methods that not only stimulate an actual increase in demand but also convert this increase into 
new, high-quality jobs. 
g)_  Methods ensuring an increase in  ~ffective demand 
Various methods may have a positive impact on effective demand: 
the range of  services 
•  the job creation effect will be the greater the more the subsidy is targeted on services 
for which the demand is very elastic from the point of  view of  price; 
•  it is also important to limit substitution effects (i.e. effects where the consumption of 
subsidised services replaces the consumption of similar services that already exist but 
are not subsidised) either by targeting the subsidy on a smaller range of services or on 
services for which substitution effects are limited; 
•  while it may be advantageous to  reduce the range of services in order to minimise 
substitution  effects,  the  choice  of a  wider range  of services  has  the  advantage  of 
promoting a "mass effect" and of making the formula more attractive. If  the supply is 
21 to develop and the increase in demand to be converted into job creation, the demand 
has to exceed a certain threshold with the result that this mass effect is necessary. 
the distribution method: 
•  using  a  collective  distribution method  for  the  subsidy may well  lead to  a  greater 
increase in demand than an individual distribution method; 
•  combining an automatic allocation of income (pay, welfare allowances, etc.) with a 
collective distribution method ensures that a mass effect is  created.  This raises the 
question, however, of people's freedom to choose how they use their income. From 
this  point of view,  automatic  income allocation  seems  less  acceptable if it relates 
solely to household services. Moreover, in the case of  personal services, the demand is 
linked to needs in  such a  way that a  subsidy not subject to  constraints  should be 
enough to stimulate the development of a substantial effective demand. A number of 
analyses9  note,  however,  that  the  development  of household  services  and  some 
personal services (home care for the elderly) comes up against a cultural obstacle as 
households are reluctant to  call upon external help in this area.  Automatic income 
allocation  during  the  launch  (or  development)  of these  services  should  make  it 
possible to overcome this obstacle. Automatic income allocation consequently entails 
a tension between the pursuit of  collective objectives and individual freedom. 
the form of  the subsidy: 
•  a subsidy adjusted to take account of income makes it possible to limit any windfall 
effects (i.e.  people on high incomes who receive a subsidy for the consumption of 
services that they would have purchased without the subsidy with the result that this 
subsidy does not create additional employment); 
•  an ex ante  subsidy means  that potential  consumers receive  their benefit directly -
whether this takes the form of an increase in purchasing power or a reduction of the 
price of the service - thereby promoting consumption, whereas, in the case of an ex 
post  subsidy,  the  benefit  is  deferred  and  is  psychologically  less  tangible  for  the 
potential consumer. 
the quality of  jobs and services: methods to promote the quality of jobs (see 4.2.2) and the 
quality of services (see 4.1.2) are likely to improve the confidence of  potential consumers and 
stimulate demand.  Schemes which have the  social management of unemployment as  their 
objective offer, however, few guarantees in this area. They often go together with a negative 
image of  menial jobs which may ultimately deter people from using this type of  service. 
The range of services, distribution methods, forms of the subsidy and the quality of  jobs and services 
can therefore  be  combined in different ways  so  that mediation between achieving  a  mass  effect, 
limiting windfall and substitution effects and making the formula acceptable can be better managed. 
bl  Methods vromoting the conversion ofincreased demand into emvlovment 
While the  initial  effect of consumption  subsidies is  to promote increased demand,  converting this 
increased demand into employment makes it necessary to look at the supply of  the services concerned. 
The  more  subsidies  relate  to  the  consumption  of employment-intensive  services,  the  greater  the 
employment effect will be. Leaving aside this preliminary and welllmown factor, however, the way in 
9  See, among others, Enjolras (1995) and Saintrain & Streel (1996). 
22 which the supply is structured and its ability to meet the demand are key factors in job creation. The 
following factors are important from this point of  view: 
•  the adoption of methods that help to create a mass effect - such as a wide range of services 
and/or a collective or even automatic distribution method- also has a publicising effect which 
promotes the creation of  a large enough number of  enterprises in the sector; 
•  an ex ante subsidy is more likely to encourage enterprise creation than an ex post subsidy as 
providers can obtain cash straight away and do not have to wait for a refund; 
•  factors connected with the social organisation of  the sector, the professionalism of  the supply 
and the status of  workers (see 4.2.2) also have an impact on the quantity of  jobs created. For 
instance, if the supply develops on the basis of precarious jobs involving occasional work at 
times that are hard to anticipate, a very small number of  jobs may well be created in practice. 
1.4.2.2  Qualitative effects 
The quality of  jobs can be assessed in several ways:  the nature of the activity, the image associated 
with this activity and the status of workers. A range of factors has to be taken into account if high-
quality jobs are to be created: 
•  the  professionalism  of the  supply:  establishment  of training  schemes,  accreditation  of 
providers, inclusion of workers in an organisation. These are essential conditions for a high-
quality service; 
•  the  status  of workers:  socio-occupational  grouping,  type  of contract  (length,  method  of 
remuneration, etc.). 
Particular attention needs to be paid to these factors  in the  case of schemes whose main aim is to 
promote employment, especially in the area of household services. For personal services, bearing in 
mind existing structures in Europe, there are relatively substantial guarantees as regards the quality of 
the jobs created. 
1.4.2.3  Budget constraints 
In the area of employment promotion, the budget constraint criterion covers both the respect of the 
balance of public finances and the possible impact of the way in which the employment measure is 
financed: 
•  the budget methods for the mechanism discussed in the section on the improvement of the 
quality of life (see 4.1.4), in order to determine the possibility of long-term extension of the 
measure and anticipate the overall cost of  the subsidy, are also relevant here; 
•  the method by which  the mechanism  is financed may have spin-off effects on employment 
throughout the economy. For instance, financing based entirely on labour may be a major curb 
on job creation. Other sources of  financing may be envisaged such as the activation of  passive 
expenditure on unemployment, taxes on enterprise profits, taxes on energy, etc. While these 
financing methods may seem attractive, they also have some limits. If  passive expenditure on 
employment is activated without back-up measures to upgrade professional skills, unemployed 
people may be "left high and dry" and the sector in question downgraded. Decisions to levy 
new taxes, such as taxes on energy, require substantial social consensus, which is far from the 
case at present. 
1.4.2.4  Job creation or social management of  unemployment? 
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We  need,  at  this  stage,  to  pinpoint  the  difference  between  subsidies  intended  directly  to  create 
employment and those whose objective is limited to the social management of unemployment. While 
the above analysis is relevant to the former, it is not very relevant to the latter. An approach based on 
the social management of  unemployment is out of  kilter with a number of  the requirements associated 
with high-quality jobs. The quality of services and the image of the sector are inevitably affected and 
there may ultimately be an adverse impact on the number of  occupational positions created. 
Some methods that have an impact on the quantity of positions created remain valid, but it does not 
seem very plausible to envisage a collective and even less an automatic distribution method when there 
are  no  guarantees  of the  quality  of the  services  and  jobs  created.  This  may  further  reduce  the 
quantitative impact of  this kind of  approach. 
There is a fairly substantial risk that this kind of approach will entail competition between ordinary 
jobs and occupational positions, leading ultimately to the destruction of genuine jobs in favour of the 
creation of  occupational positions. 
This  leads  us  to  conclude  that  a  study of the  quantitative  and  qualitative  effects  of consumption 
subsidies  on  employment  is  of meaning  only  if the  objective  is  genuinely  one  of job creation. 
Integration  policies,  provided  that  they  make  provision  for  the  establishment  of progressive 
qualification schemes and allow unemployed people to gain access to high-quality jobs, are similar to 
these measures. 
1.5  Evaluation of subsidy measures 
I 5.1  A proposed analysis grid 
Evaluation criteria can be introduced into the initial grid locating the various subsidies on the basis of 
objectives  and type  of services.  This  makes  it  possible  to  formulate  an  analysis  grid  for  subsidy 
measures. 
Table 4:  A proposed analysis grid 
OBJECTIVE  REFERENCE CRITERIA  METHODS  TYPE OF SERVICES 
Personal  Household 
services  services 
QUALITY OF  Equity 
LIFE 
Quality of  the service 
Structuring of  the supply 
Budget constraints 
EMPLOYMENT  Quantitative effects 
Qualitative effects 
Budget constraints 
The following tables can be used to assess the consistency of the methods used, the type of service 
involved and the objectives pursued for each consumption subsidy. For this purpose, the methods that 
may influence the impact of  the subsidy are listed for each criterion and their relevance or importance 
determined on the basis of the type of service that is being promoted. The analysis has shown that 
24 mediation may be necessary between methods of equal importance.  For instance, if the  automatic 
allocation of  income for the consumption of  household services makes it possible to guarantee a certain 
level of  job creation, it may limit people's freedom to choose what they consume. We have therefore 
divided "important" methods into those that are "preferable" and those which may be "questionable". 
The subsidy can then be evaluated by checking whether or not these methods have been used. The lack 
of  a "preferable" method raises questions about the consistency of the measure from the point of view 
of  the target objective and the type of  service involved. It should be noted, however, that some methods 
overlap to some extent and that the lack of  one method may be of  no consequence if  use has been made 
of another method making it possible to  achieve the same result. For instance, if the amount of the 
subsidy is adjusted according to intensity of  needs, it is not absolutely necessary to adopt regulations to 
prevent the creaming off  of  those needs that require the most attention. 





a) Subsidy adjusted on the basis of  income 
b) Subsidy proportional to needs 
c)  Ex ante subsidy (or ex post with facility for 
non-taxpayers) 
d)  Subsidy  in  kind  (targeted  on  a  specific 
service) 
e) Automatic allocation in the case of collective 
distribution 
f)  Regulations  to  ensure  the  same  quality  for 
everyone 
g)  Regulations  to  prevent  creaming  off  of 
greatest needs 
Quality of  the  h)  Formulation  of  accreditation  criteria  for 
service  providers 
i) Definition of  service quality standards 
j) Use  of a  provider  organisation  rather  than 
self-employed workers 
k) Intermediate facilities: 
- training 
- information 
- quality control 
Structuring of  1) Choice offered to users 
the supply 
m) Overall management of  providers 
n) Intermediate information facilities 
Budget  o) Sources of  finance 
1  O Key to Tables 5 and 6 
"preferable" method 
important, but "questionable" method 
"irrelevant" method 
Personal services  Household services 
Example: The automatic allocation of income for the consumption of  personal services is questionable as regards 
the quality of life objective [box e, marked 2) in Table 5].  It is "irrelevant" from the point of view of the 
employment promotion objective,  given that  the  demand,  and therefore  employment,  will  develop  as  a 
function of  needs [box c), marked 3] in Table 6). 
26 constraints 
p) Cost of  subsidy can be predetermined 
27 Table 5 shows the connection between the choice of methods and the type of service covered by the 
consumption subsidy. 
In the case of  personal services, the issue of equity is paramount. The best formulae from this point of 
view in all likelihood entail a subsidy adjusted according to need and possibly income, which is ex 
ante, personal and non-exchangeable. If a flat-rate subsidy or a subsidy that is adjusted solely on the 
basis of income is  chosen,  it is  important for  the  subsidy to  be backed up  by regulations limiting 
creaming-off risks.  In the  case  of household  services,  however,  which provide  essentially private 
benefits,  equity is not a key issue  as  regards access to  these  services. If equity is  a concern,  it is 
obviously always possible to adjust the subsidy and/or to enact regulations. 
The anti-redistributive nature of a subsidy taking the form of a tax allowance for the consumption of 
certain services should also be borne in mind. Low-income households who have no tax to pay are 
unable to benefit from a subsidy of  this type. Depending on the nature of  the tax allowance, it may even 
provide a benefit that is proportional to household income. In addition to this anti-redistributive effect, 
questions are raised as to whether a measure of  this type will create a market limited to those who are 
best off - running counter to the principle of equal access to personal services - and may lead to the 
emergence of a new domestic service rather than a genuine occupational sector. This latter risk seems 
to apply chiefly to household services. 
The quality of the service is also paramount in personal services.  Quality requires professional and 
relational qualifications, thereby making it necessary to step up the professionalism of the supply and 
to organise the sector in the form of  businesses. These conditions are often already satisfied in part by 
existing providers. This is for instance true in Belgium in the fields of home help services and child 
care. Household services require less  demanding qualifications than personal services. It is  for this 
reason that these services are  often seen as  a major source of jobs for people with few  skills.  The 
conditions under which subsidies are granted, such as accreditation of  providers, their registration with 
an organisation and recognised professional status may help, however, to ensure a high-quality supply 
and create confidence among potential consumers. 
From the  point of view of the  structuring  of the  supply,  it  is  important to  develop  intermediate 
structures in order to reassure consumers about providers and rectify any information problems (see 
§6.2). This is particularly true of  services with a high relational intensity, where consumers lack a priori 
criteria for assessing the quality of  the service. 
Budget constraints that influence the choice of  financing methods for the subsidy should obviously not 
be forgotten.  For reasons of both political feasibility and the long-term development of the sector, it 
seems more advisable to adopt a financing method for the subsidy that minimises public expenditure. 
In very schematic terms, Table 5 shows that in the case of  personal services, most emphasis needs to be 
placed on equal access to such services and on their quality. Considerations of  equity and quality of  the 
service seem, however, less crucial in the case of  household services, although guarantees of  the quality 
of  the service may stimulate demand for these services. 






a) Wide range of  services* 
b) Collective distribution 
c) Automatic allocation of  income for consumption 
d) Subsidy adjusted on the basis of  income 
e) Ex ante subsidy 
f) Subsidy in kind (targeted on a specific service) 
g) Guarantees of  service and job quality: 
- accreditation of  providers 
- formulation of  service quality standards 
- inclusion in an organisation 
-quality of  professional status 
Qualitative effects  h)  Aspects  relating  to  the  professional  nature  of the 
supply 
-training schemes 
- provider accreditation 
- inclusion in an organisation 
i) Aspects relating to the quality of  professional status 
Budget constraints  j) Sources of  finance 
k) Cost of  subsidy can be predetermined 





Table 6 also highlights some priorities in the choice of methods in terms of  the service in question. If 
an employment promotion objective is being pursued, it can be expected that, in the case of personal 
services,  the quantitative  effect on employment will  be  shaped  largely by the  extent of the needs 
identified and actually expressed. A consumption subsidy should then lead to job creation in this sector. 
The  quality  of  employment  is  guaranteed  in  all  likelihood  by  the  requirements  of  greater 
professionalism on which a quality service is  based. These requirements mean that formulae whose 
objective is the social management of  unemployment are inappropriate. 
In the case of household services, however, the methods to which priority should be given are those 
likely to improve the quality of  the jobs created. It seems essential in this case to avoid the creation of  a 
secondary  labour  market (which  might  lead  to  a  new domestic  service  or create  menial jobs).  A 
development of  this type could well create a negative image which could ultimately curb consumption 
and therefore employment.  While the quality of the service  is  less crucial here than in  the case of 
personal services, it does seem to play a fairly substantial role in terms of  the number of  jobs created, 
especially  from  the  point  of the  view  of confidence  in  providers  of household  services.  Some 
experiences show, however, that other factors,  especially financial factors, may encourage people to 
29 use the subsidy even though there are no guarantees of  the quality of  the service and or of  the status of 
the workers providing these services. 
It is also important to consider the case of  a subsidy that relates to both types of  service simultaneously. 
Given the different requirements of  the two types of service in the area of  quality of life it seems that 
the employment objective will be paramount. If  this approach is also to satisfy quality requirements, a 
single subsidy undoubtedly has to be associated with a number of institutions specific to each type of 
service so that the supply can be organised in a way that is in keeping with the specific requirements of 
each service. The same applies to any regulation measures that may need to be associated with certain 
services in order to ensure equity. 
15.2  Evaluation of  existing or planned subsidies 
The various consumption subsidies examined (see Annex 2) can be located in our general analysis grid. 
Each of  these subsidies can be analysed in detail using the grid set out above. In this instance we shall 
merely present the initial and general lessons that can be drawn from  a comparison of these various 
subsidies. 
Table 7 
Personal services  Household services 
Quality of  life objective  Cheque-Prestation (France); 
Dependency insurance (Germany); 
Service vouchers for dependent persons 
and for child care (Finland); 
Service vouchers for child care (United 
Kingdom) 
Employment objective:  Cheque-emploi-service (France);  Cheque-emploi-service (France); 
-job creation  Titre-emploi-service (France)  Home Service Scheme (Denmark); 
Centres for home care services 
(Germany) 
f-------------------------------------f-------------------
- social management of  Cheque-ALE (Belgium)  Cheque-ALE (Belgium) 
unemployment 
It can be seen from the table that most existing subsidies whose aim is to improve the quality of  life are 
in the area of personal services, whereas those intended to promote employment are being introduced 
chiefly in the area of household services. In the case of "multi-service" formulae, such as the Belgian 
cheque-ALE or the French cheque-emploi-service, it can also be seen that almost all the demand (over 
80%) is in practice for household services. This bears out the priorities identified in our analysis. 
In the first instance, there are higher vocational qualification and relational requirements for personal 
services than for household services. In most subsidy formulae relating to personal services, the stress 
is  placed on the importance of using professionals and setting up facilities to control the quality of 
services and accredit providers. A policy to promote employment in the area of personal services may 
therefore  require  back-up  measures,  such  as  the  establishment  of training  schemes,  and  will  be 
effective only over a  longer period (one to two  years).  Bearing  in  mind their  lower  qualification 
requirements, household services may seem to be a source of  jobs that can be tapped more easily by 
people  with  few  skills  and/or the  long-term  unemployed  and  that can  be  more  rapidly  exploited. 
Increasing the  professionalism  of the  supply  of services  is,  however,  also  a  concern  in  formulae 
30 relating to household services, as in the case of  the Danish Home Service Scheme where it is wished to 
encourage the development of home service enterprises. This is also a major concern in France in the 
case of  the cheque-service-emploi where provision has been made, in the Law of January 1996, for a 
levy of 0.15% of  the wage bill paid during the current year to be paid by employers and set aside for 
the continuing vocational training of  providers. 
A  second  explanation may have  to  do  with  the  European  notion  of the  welfare  state:  the  public 
authorities recognise that the needs satisfied by personal services are important and consequently want 
to  guarantee the quality of these  services  and  equal  access.  The  community does  not,  at present, 
consider that the needs covered by household services are fundamental for people's quality of  life. It is 
therefore more for reasons of  the potential source of  jobs that this sector represents that the community 
11 
considers it important to subsidise this kind of  service  . 
Lastly, job creation initiatives are in most cases intended to convert undeclared into legal work; this 
obviously has more of an effect on the household service sector bearing in mind that the supply of 
personal services is more structured and professional. 
In practice, moreover, subsidies that have a quality of life objective and relate in most cases to personal 
services make a significant contribution to job creation. 
It may be asked in this context whether every citizen should have a universal right to personal services. 
This would justify an automatic allocation of income for the consumption of these services, together 
with collective distribution and the adjustment of the subsidy according to need. This is for instance 
true of  German dependency insurance. 
Choosing to adjust the subsidy on the basis of income again raises the debate on selectivity.  Most 
subsidies are in practice paid as flat-rate subsidies, such as the British service vouchers,  or as  a tax 
allowance which is more beneficial the higher the income, such as the French cheque-service-emploi. 
None of these formulae achieve an objective of redistribution. To achieve this objective, it would be 
necessary to establish a subsidy that decreases as income increases or a "negative tax" that is paid to 
people  whose  income  is  too  low  to  benefit  from  a  tax  allowance.  The  Belgian  cheque-ALE  is 
somewhere in the middle: the subsidy takes the form of  a tax allowance but has a minimum that is not 
linked to income and, moreover, the price of the service may be slightly reduced for people on low 
incomes. The Finnish system of service vouchers is a good example of a redistribution system as the 
subsidy is, in most local authorities, higher the lower the consumer's income. 
Our analysis has also made it possible to connect the choice of  targets with the objectives pursued and 
the services involved. In the context of a "quality of life"  objective, targeting on personal services 
entails targeting on consumers (the elderly, households with children). 
The "employment" objective may also entail a risk of creating a secondary labour market. Subsidies 
targeted on a type of  provider such as the long-term unemployed may be risky if  they are not supported 
by back-up measures or guarantees of the creation of high-quality jobs. The French cheque-service-
emploi, under which a contract of  employment must be agreed between the consumer and the provider 
if the service exceeds eight hours per week or four consecutive weeks per year, is  a formula which 
offers genuine prospects of job creation.  Under the Belgian scheme,  however,  unemployed service 
providers retain their unemployed status with the result that long-term unemployed people are trapped 
in a secondary labour market. 
11 If  these services are intended for beneficiaries whose demand is felt to be important by the community, they 
come into the category of  personal services. This is true of  household service subsidies for the elderly or for 
convalescents. 
31 These  lessons  may  provide  food  for  thought  when  developing  new  formulae  for  consumption 
subsidies. For instance, the Irish project whose objective is (according to the questionnaire received) to 
integrate the long-term unemployed through the provision of household and personal services, could 
well  take  note  of the  drawbacks  of the  Belgian  cheque-ALE  and  French  cheque-service-emploi 
schemes. 
32 1.6  Transverse questions 
By way of  conclusion, we feel that it is important to place this debate on consumption subsidies back in 
the context of the development of local  services. It is  then necessary to compare consumption and 
production  subsidies  so  that  their  respective  advantages  and  drawbacks  can  be  discussed.  This 
discussion cannot,  moreover,  be  isolated from  the  broader issue  of the  socio-economic  framework 
within which local services can be organised. 
16.1  Consumption subsidy or production subsidy? 
Although we have concentrated up to now on consumption subsidies, it may be interesting to examine 
the advantages of a consumption subsidy in comparison with a production subsidy. A consumption 
subsidy, whose aim is to create an effective demand, needs the supply to develop to an extent that is 
able to meet this growth in demand. Measures to promote the growth of  the supply consequently need 
to be considered. Similarly, the use of a production subsidy will increase the ability of the supply to 
meet the demand but will not guarantee the creation of a new demand. In some cases, measures to 
support the demand may therefore also need to be taken. This highlights the importance of promoting 
the growth of  both supply and demand. 
This issue goes beyond the scope of this report and is worth examining in greater depth. An analysis 
grid is included here as a starting point for further discussion 12. 
Table 9 examines various production and consumption subsidy formulae  (making use  initially of a 
"generic formula"  for  consumption  subsidies)  against  the  six  evaluation  criteria  discussed  above. 
Impact on public finances,  considered up  to now as  a constraint, could prove to be a key factor in 
choosing between these two main types of  subsidy. 
The  table  shows  the  potential  advantages  offered  by  each  type  of subsidy  with  respect  to  these 
evaluation criteria. Ultimately, however, the methods used for the subsidy will determine whether or 
not these potential advantages can be  put into practice. It should be  borne in mind that production 
subsidies can take many forms  and are not just limited to policies connected with employment and 
intended to reduce the cost of labour or integration (see Part  1).  It is  therefore important to include 
subsidies paid to social services, as in the case of  nurseries or home help services, in the table. 
The boundary between the two types of subsidy is  not always  clear.  Taking the example of a per-
service subsidy paid to  child care facilities,  this aid  is  paid directly to the provider and leads  to  a 
reduction  of the  price  paid  by the  consumer.  It can  be  considered,  therefore,  that this  subsidy  is 
consumer-oriented (and can thus be considered as a consumption subsidy) or producer-oriented, given 
that the subsidy is paid directly to the producer but depends on the number of services provided (and 
therefore  the  extent  of consumption).  The  Danish  and  Finnish  schemes,  discussed  above  as 
consumption  subsidy schemes  on the  basis  of the  questionnaires,  are  in  fact  based  on  per-service 
subsidies. 
Even at this  stage of the analysis the table highlights  some important factors.  In the  first  instance, 
consumption  subsidies  may  be  finely  adjusted  to  income  or  intensity  of need.  This  possibility of 
adjustment (or targeting) promotes equity - among other things by limiting creaming-off risks - and 
possibly  employment  by  reducing  windfall  effects.  Production  subsidies  do  not  offer  the  same 
12 The presentation at the seminar on 15  May of a proposed Dutch subsidy taking the form of a reduction of 
labour costs and intended to promote employment by developing household cleaning services made it clear 
that it would be useful to extend this analysis to production subsidies. 
33 possibilities, except perhaps in the case of  a "forward funding" system where the amount of  the subsidy 
is  based on anticipated needs, thereby making it possible to apply a graduated tariff to users. A per-
service subsidy, which could be seen as a production subsidy, also enables this type of  adjustment. 
Consumption subsidies are  also  "consumer-led", thereby encouraging competition among providers 
more than production subsidy systems. This increased competition may have positive effects on the 
range and quality of  the services on offer. It was this type of consideration that to some extent shaped 
the establishment of  the child care voucher system in Finland. 
It is important, lastly, to bear in mind the impact of  these various subsidy measures on public finances 
in the present context of budget constraints. The budget context in which these measures are placed 
will, in particular, shape their impact. 
In more general terms, it would be interesting to take this analysis further by comparing the efficiency 
of  different types of subsidy from the point of  view, in particular, of  public finances, employment and 
growth.  A  study of this kind was conducted  in  France,  using  an  economic  simulation which took 
account of secondary macro-economic effects, for the report on local development and employment 
initiatives (European Commission, 1995). 
In this study, the effects of an active employment policy geared to the development of local services 
and making use of a consumption subsidy were in particular compared with the effects of a policy of 
general reduction of  employers' social security contributions in exchange for job creation, i.e. a supply-
side subsidy. It is noted in the study that: "the main difference between these two policies is sequential. 
In an active policy to create service-sector jobs, the jobs are created first and lead to an immediate 
reduction in the cost of social security expenditure. In the case of a reduction of employers' social 
security contributions, the social security balance initially deteriorates and then improves as employees' 
contributions are recovered. (  ... ) If  job creation is left entirely to the good will of  private enterprises, the 
overall outcome is some three times less effective than that of an active policy to create service-sector 
jobs. In the long term, however, the budget cost per ex-post job created is comparable". According to 
these calculations, the former policy makes it possible to envisage the creation of 235 000 jobs for a 
budget cost per job ofECU 12 000. 
Under the latter policy some 79 000 jobs would be created, however, for an individual budget cost of 
Ecu 10 oooB. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 16.2  What type of  consumption subsidy matches what type of  socio-economic organisation of  local 
services 
A discussion of subsidies cannot be separated from more general thinking about the development and 
organisation of  local services. 
The  local  services covered by a  consumption  subsidy meet individual  demand on the  basis  of an 
"objective" geographical proximity or a "subjective" proximity shaped by the relational dimension of 
the service. In the case of  personal services, therefore, the relationship between the provider and user is 
crucial in determining the quality of  the service. In some cases, this proximity can be enhanced by the 
way in which the service itself is organised and in particular by the degree of involvement of users in 
the design and/or operation of the service. Users can play a part both in the operation of the service 
(nurseries where parents help professionals to look after the children) and in the design of the service 
(management board, consultation on organisational methods, etc.) or even by supporting the values 
underpinning the body so that "supply and demand is jointly constructed" (Laville, 1992). This demand 
therefore obeys a dynamic which differs  from  the conventional consumption of goods  sold on the 
market and from conventional social services. 
In order to grasp one of  the fundamental issues in the organisation of  these services, it should be borne 
in mind that in almost all Member States, the community sets great store by the social utility of some 
local services, in particular personal services, and assigns criteria of equity and social well-being to 
them. These services do not just generate private benefits (i.e. for the individuals who consume them) 
but  collective  benefits  as  well.  They  generally  require,  therefore,  public  regulation  or even  non-
commercial funding,  because,  if they were produced  by market rules,  their operation would entail 
production choices and a distribution that would not be acceptable to the community. 
The debate on local services is therefore at the crossroads of economic, social and political choices. 
While the public authorities are showing considerable interest in the employment potential offered by 
these services, their development cannot be dissociated from social and political issues. These services 
may therefore help to strengthen solidarity. Depending on the way in which users are involved in the 
organisation  of these  services  at  local  level,  their  development  may  ultimately  play  a  part  in 
constructing active citizenship. 
Local services entail far-reaching change to the organisational methods shaped by the market/welfare 
state  synergy.  Although  some  sectors  have  already  been  well  regulated  (for  instance  home  care), 
developments in  organisational methods and  in particular the introduction of consumption subsidies 
will have an impact on the way which in which this field  is  structured. Various configurations are 
possible depending on the directions taken. It is possible to sketch out three "general scenarios" which 
could emerge as local services develop: an integration sector, a quasi-market and the acceptance of a 
plural economy. 
1.6.2.1  An integration sector 
If the  main  objective  of public  policies  is  to  exploit  local  services  as  a  sector  into  which  the 
unemployed can be integrated in a context of  social management of  unemployment, the above analysis 
has highlighted the risk that a secondary labour market may emerge, within which the State would 
become "the manager of marginalised labour". This scenario would create a dual society by offering 
(or even  imposing)  an  occupation,  pretend job (or pretend  activity)  to  people  excluded  from  the 
conventional labour market. Formulae intended to employ the unemployed under precarious conditions 
that trap them in a circuit parallel to the labour market are good examples of  this. 
This policy does little to solve the problem of the exclusion of the unemployed and may, in contrast, 
help to develop activities taking the form of "a new domestic service on the cheap and with no proper 
status". This system offers, moreover, no guarantees from the point of  view of the quality of services. 
36 In an "integration sector" of this type, the negative image of menial jobs requiring few qualifications 
would undoubtedly be reinforced. Initial evaluations (among others the Belgian cheque-ALE) show that 
these formulae relate chiefly to household rather than personal services. While these formulae may be 
appropriate for "manual" services, services with a high relational content where trust is crucial would 
be difficult to develop in an environment which does not point towards quality. Steps need to be taken 
to resolve the question of  trust between the provider and consumer. Any consumption subsidy formula 
targeted on a socio-occupational ategory of  providers, i.e. those excluded from the labour market, may 
well drift in this way towards an "integration sector". 
I 6 2 2  The emergence of  a "quasi-market" 
The creation of a "quasi-market" is generally seen as an alternative to this "integration sector", i.e. the 
development of a local services market where consumers can choose among various providers who 
have been caused to compete in order to encourage efficient practices and where subsidies are used to 
create an effective demand. While this formula has undoubted advantages (choice of the provider by 
the consumer, stimulation of efficiency, match between supply and demand, etc.), the extension of a 
market approach to some local services may entail a number of risks from  the point of view of the 
quality of the  service,  the  structure  of the  supply  and  equity.  Both economic theory and  national 
experiences  (Legrand,  1993)  have  highlighted  "market  failures"  in  this  field,  in  particular  in  the 
personal services sector. 
In relational services, the information gap between the provider and the consumer means that the latter 
finds  it difficult to evaluate the quality of the service.  The provider can use the consumer's lack of 
information about or control over the quality of the service to provide a service of lower quality or 
entailing less effort. Trust is therefore crucial to many personal services. Various ways of remedying 
these obstacles are contained in economic theory.  The provider can,  if the relationship between the 
provider and the consumer takes  place over time,  build up  a reputation.  He can also  highlight the 
quality of the service. The use of qualified workers may be a positive signal. Using an intermediary 
who  certifies  the  quality  of providers  is  another  possible  route  (applicable,  for  instance,  to  self-
employed workers affiliated to a network which provides training and control). The adoption of  a legal 
non-profit-making status (such as an association) is also a way of showing that the information gap is 
not going to be  exploited to the  detriment of the consumer.  The  involvement of consumers in the 
operation of the  service  is  another way in  which this  relationship  of trust can be  built up.  These 
considerations point to various subsidy methods:  qualification and training of workers, accreditation 
standards for providers, place of associations and involvement of consumers in the operation of the 
service, etc. 
If it is  accepted that different types of provider (enterprises, associations and public authorities) are 
needed to satisfy a wide-ranging demand, it also has to be recognised that the market will not bring 
about this plurality on its own. Barriers to entry (for instance unequal access to capital) may limit the 
market entry chances of some types of provider. The vulnerability of consumers in many relational 
services also makes it difficult to change from one provider to another with the result that they become 
captive (once the relationship has been forged  between the consumer and the provider, the cost of 
change is substantial for the consumer), thereby limiting the possibility of competition. The dynamic 
by which needs are expressed also differs from traditional consumption patterns that can be revealed 
only by a  commercial  approach.  There  could  also  be  unhealthy  competition between  providers  if 
different  subsidy  mechanisms  were  to  coexist with  no  harmonisation.  The  introduction  of a  new 
consumption subsidy, for  instance, for which only some providers are eligible would destabilise an 
existing supply subsidised by other mechanisms. This may be a key problem when different subsidies 
have different objectives. A consumption subsidy forming part of an employment policy, for instance, 
raises the  question  of the  effects that this  subsidy will have  on mechanisms  tied  in  with national 
solidarity. 
37 It is therefore important to adopt a broader-ranging approach to subsidy mechanisms and to analyse the 
interactions between different subsidies. Instead of  creating a separate "new market", it is necessary to 
find ways of adapting a field where there are already many actors and financing methods in order to 
cope with increasing demand. This raises the question of  the back-up measures that are needed if  this 
plurality is to take shape: mediation between supply and demand, support for the development of new 
projects,  improved  access  to  capital  for  associations,  harmonising  the  tax  situations  of different 
providers, etc. 
From the point of view of equity,  a quasi-market formula provided with a system of consumption 
subsidies that does not take sufficient account of  the intensity of  need may entail a risk of  creaming off. 
Providers will, in this case, tend to disregard people whose needs are greatest. It is therefore necessary 
to avoid any incentives to discriminate between consumers. 
Promoting the organisation of a new quasi-market without accepting the limits of this market and the 
experience of many of  those involved in the field of personal services would have detrimental effects 
from the point of view of service quality, the actual emergence of a plurality of providers and equity. 
The approach used to create a plural economy consequently differs from the approach used to develop 
a new market. 
1.6.2.3  Towards a plural economy 
If a "plural economy" is to emerge, the plurality of providers needs to be recognised and the various 
sources of  funds articulated. 
Public and private providers are supplemented by all those involved in the social economy who often 
play a role of anticipation, exposure of demand and social innovation in the area of local services. 
Many initiatives are organised on the basis of  partnerships or agreements between one or more service 
providers. How is this plurality of providers to be managed? What are their specific features? What 
partnerships should be encouraged? 
Local services may be financed by various resources. Commercial resources are represented by the fees 
paid by consumers. Non-commercial resources are formed by all the subsidies awarded by the public 
authorities. "Voluntary" resources include gifts, local solidarity contributions and charitable works. If 
there are different forms of finance in the field of local services, one initiative in most cases harnesses 
the different commercial, non-commercial and voluntary resources.  The challenge is  then to design 
packages that are durable, efficient and guarantee equal access. 
This plural economy therefore calls into question various oppositions that have been shaped by the 
market/welfare  state  synergy:  private/public,  commercial/non-commercial,  economic/social, 
market/State,  etc.  The  challenge  is  to  place  the  development  of local  services  within  this  plural 
economy in a dynamic way. What structures need to be promoted to ensure the durable development of 
activities  intended  to  improve  the  quality of life  and  social  cohesion?  The  development of local 
services  requires  a  change  in  the  organisational  methods  practised  by the  public  authorities.  The 
question of  finance and therefore of  forms of  subsidy is an important facet of  this thinking. 
We hope that we have opened up some paths for exploration in this respect by putting forward an 
analysis grid for consumption subsidy methods. An analysis of subsidy methods has, however, to be 
accompanied by more general thinking about the type of development that is  appropriate for  local 
services. We are at the crossroads:  reinforcing the divide in  our societies by creating an integration 
sector solely for the marginalised who  are  placed in  menial jobs, promoting a quasi-market whose 
limits are obvious in the light of  the high relational content of  the demand or promoting the emergence 
of  a plural economy in which the specific nature of each field is recognised, thereby setting in motion 
durable development and high-quality activities that have an impact on social cohesion and ... creating 
high-quality jobs. 
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42 ANNEX 2 : QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AN ANALYSIS OF CONSUMPTION SUBSIDIES 
In this annex, we reproduce the questionnaire which has been sent to the participants to the seminar 
on  subsidies  to  consumption  organised  by  the  European  Commission  on  15  May  1996.  This 
questionnaire has to make it possible to collect complete and structured information for each kind of 
subsidy for the consumption of household services. The data are intended to allow a comparative 
analysis of the aims, the expected results and the limitations of the various measures. The possible 
choices will make it possible to identify a limited number of "models"  ,as terms of reference for the 
analysis. 
------------ Questionnair~------------
Y  ou are invited to answer directly on the questionnaire in the spaces provided for this purpose. With 
regard to the series of  options, simply put a cross in front of  the relevant choice. Several options can 
be selected simultaneously. 
If the range of the options does not enable you to answer satisfactorily, do not hesitate to propose 
another answer accompanied by an explanation, either in the answer spaces, or on additional sheets 
by  specifying  the  number  of the  question  concerned.  Answer  spaces  are  not  intended  to  be 
constricting. 
I. Practical information 
1. Specify the nature of  the measure studied: 
•  Services voucher: 
•  Direct consumption subsidy: 
•  Dependence insurance: 
•  ()ther :  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specify if  necessary : -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The studied measure: 
•  is a proposal : 
•  has been put into action: 
in the latter case, since when?  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
•  other possibility : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. This involves : 
•  an experimental measure :  anticipated until 
•  a final measure: 
•  other possibility : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Does this mechanism involve an initiative: 
•  private: 
•  public: 
Specify:  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. The measure is in force at the : 
•  national level : 
•  regional level : 
•  local level : 
•  company level : 
•  other option : -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Is there other practical information you wish to mention within this framework:-------------------------------
43 II. Objectives 
7. Explain in brief  the aims pursued by the measure: 
- ()bjective 1 : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- ()bjective 2 :  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- ()bjective 3 :  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Additional objectives :  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example: to meet certain needs that are currently badly satisfied,  to promote the job creation,  to promote 
the recruitment of  poorly qualified unemployed workers,  to ease administrative requirements,  to promote the 
development of new sectors,  to  reduce  moonlighting,  to  diversify  the  range of  possibilities  offered to  the 
consumers, etc. 
III. Targeting 
8. The mechanism 
•  does it cover a varied number of  services : 
•  is it targeted on an individual type of  service: 
Which service : 
•  Aid for dependent persons (old, sick, handicapped persons) : 
•  Specify: 
•  Childhood (guard in residence sick child, creches, etc.) : 
S  pee  ify : -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
•  Domestic services (domestic tasks, gardening, etc.): 
S  pee  ify :  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
•  ()thers :  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
S  pee  ify if  necessary : -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
.  s t  e  ormu a targete  on a partlcu ar type o  service prov1 
includes both type of  organisation and type of  worker. 
- With regard to the type of  organisation : 
9 .1. The authorized service providers are: 
•  self-employed persons 
•  organisations 
In the latter case, specify if  the organisation acts as a : 
•  Public organisation : 
•  Private company with the profit motive 
•  ()rganisation of  social economy (associations, mutual societies, co-operatives, etc.) 
•  ()ther : -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
S  pee  ify if  necessary : -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9.2. Do people providing services have to be approved? 
•  yes: 
•  not: 
If  so, what conditions are required for approval? : ---------------------------------------------------------------------
9.3. Are there providers of  these same services who would not benefit from the subsidy? 
•  yes: 
•  not: 
If  so, who? :  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
44 - With regard to the type of  worker: 
9.4. Does the formula address itself to a particular socio-professional category? 
•  Professionals : 
•  Unemployed : 
•  Long-term unemployed: 
•  Unqualified persons : 
•  Non specified : 
•  ()ther :  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specizy if  necessary:  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9.5. What is the statute planned for these people receiving benefits? 
•  Employee:  •  Self-employed person: ----- •  Unemployed 
person: 
•  ()ther :  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
•  Full time:  •  Part-time work: 
•  Maximum number of  permitted hours : -----------------------------------------------------------------------
•  Contract of  given duration :  •  Contract of  unspecified duration: 
9.6. What is the type of  remuneration? 
•  Hourly 
•  ()n a contract basis 
•  ()ther:  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soecif\r if  necessarv: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Is the mechanism intended for one particular category of  recipients ? 
•  Yes:  •  No: 
If  so, which ?  .  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Examples: the elderly, employees, all private individuals with children, etc. 
11.  Clarizy the links existing between your objectives (question 7) and your choices regarding the 
various types of  targeting envisaged above (questions 8 to 10)? 
()n this basis, can you prioritize the three identified types of  targeting ? 
-Priority 1: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Priority 2  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Priority 3 : -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example: one can envisage a formula of  which the principal objective is the reintegration of  the unemployed, 
so that priority is  given to targeting the type of  person receiving benefits,  the choice of  the services being 
secondary and conditioned by the type of  person receiving benefits. 
IV. Subsidy mechanism and financing 
12. Within which budgetary framework is the mechanism registered? 
•  Social allocations (family benefits, health, unemployment, pensions) : 
•  Public budget (taxation) : 
•  Wage bill: 
•  Private budget (companies, associations, etc.): : 
•  ()ther :  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specizy if  necessary :  -·· -··-.. -·· -··-.. -··-··-··  -··-··-·· -··-··-·· -·· -··-··-.. -··-··-··-.. -·· -··-··-··  -··-··-··-··-··-··-.. _. 
13.  Is the  subsidy received ex ante  (i.e.  in  a way anticipated  at purchase) or ex-post (i.e.  via a 
refunding or tax deduction mechanism)? 
45 •  by the consumer :  ex ante:  ex post: 
•  by the service provider :  ex ante:  ex post: 
Explain if  necessary : -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example 1:  if  the service provider pays a price after deduction of  the subsidy,  it acts as an ex-ante subsidy. 
Conversely, if  the recipient pays the full price and receives the subsidy by means of  a tax deduction,  it acts as 
an ex-post subsidy. 
Example 2:  When the service provider receives the ex-ante subsidy,  the person receiving benefits can receive 
the subsidy at the time of  the benefit (in addition to the price paid by the recipient) or receive the subsidy after 
the benefit, for example by returning to the public authorities a part of  the service voucher giving him a right 
to a subsidy. 
14. Is the subsidy an amount that is : 
•  fixed: 
•  variable according to the income : 
•  variable according to the needs : 
•  variable according to income and to needs : 
In each case, indicate if  a maximum amount is set out in the subsidy :  ---------------------------------------------
S  pee  icy if  necessary : -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example:  one can imagine a dependence-cheque for residential care of  elderly people,  where the subsidy is 
proportionate to the level of  poverty and dependence.  The subsidy can,  however, have a ceiling value of  20,000 
Belgian francs a month. 
15. Spec  icy the amount of  the subsidy by elaborating the mechanism. 
Example 1:  the service value is of  BFR 800 I hour; the consumer pays the whole of  it by means of  a voucher 
that he buys BFR 800 each; he re-claims a part of  this amount in the form of  a fvced tax deduction of  BFR500. 
In the best case, the service therefore costs BFR 300 (ex post) to the consumer. 
Example 2: for the same service,  one can imagine a system that operates through giving wages in the form of 
vouchers.  BFR 300 in  wages  can be received by the employee in  the form  of  a voucher worth BFR 800 
exempted  from tax.  This formula also involves a public subsidy of  BFR 500. 
16. How is the cost of  the subsidy supposed to be financed? 
Example: partly by an increase in taxation and partly by using the savings made as regards unemployment 
following the creation jobs; by reallocating certain resources of  Social Security; etc  .. 
V. Operation of  the subsidy 
17. Spec  icy the method of  distribution involved in the mechanism : 
- Individual method of  distribution : 
•  possibility for any authorized recipient to purchase subsidy (see. question 10): 
- Collective method of  distribution (organised) : 
•  assigned a share of  rise in wages : 
•  assigned social allocations : 
•  other:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
46 Specizy if  necessary : -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18.  In the case of collective distribution,  is  the assignment of income to the consumption of the 
subsidized services : 
•  obligatory ? 
•  voluntary ? 
Example:  certain formulas  involve  a part of  rise  in  wages  in  the form  of service vouchers,  others  allow 
individuals to buy services vouchers if  they wish to pay  for them. 
19. What is the support for the mechanism (in particular for service vouchers, for the other types of 
mechanism if  necessary) : 
•  paper-support ?  •  bank account?  •  another 
support? 
Specizy: 
20. In the event of  paper-support: 
•  personal ?  •  exchangeable ? 
Specizy : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
•  Fixed duration of  validity or not? Specizy:  ----------------------------------------------------------------------
21. What is the organisation responsible for the distribution of the mechanism (in particular for the 
vouchers, for the other types of  mechanism if  necessary) ? 
Example:  The  distribution  of the  services  voucher  can  be  ensured  by  the  post  office,  by  a  financial 
organisation, by a non-profit-making association, etc. 
VI. Regulation 
By regulation, one intends the set of standards and measures which together come to support the 
methods of  the mechanism in achieving its aims. 
22.  Can you  specizy the  elements of regulation that you  defined within the framework  of your 
objectives ? 
•  Equality in service access: obligation for the service providers to accept anybody's voucher (in the 
case  where  it  would be  in  the  interest of  service providers to  select the  demand to  which  they 
respond). 
•  Quality of  the service: quality standards,  conditions of  approval for the service providers,  required 
qualifications, etc 
•  Management of  the diversity of  service providers and of  financing:  measures to avoid competition 
between subsidies of  different nature and to avoid unfair competition (example: the black economy). 
VII. Supporting measures 
So  that the mechanism can achieve the  set aims,  it  is  advisable  in  the  majority of the cases, to 
consider measures other than just those designed to directly stimulate consumption. 
23.  Within the framework of your mechanism, do  you envisage measures covering the following 
aspects? If  so, specizy why and how. 
•  the setting up of  adequate training structures : ------------------------------------------------------------------
•  the setting up of intermediate structures intended to play a role of mediation between supply 
and demand, and between the various service providers: .  ----------------------------------------------------
•  the setting up of structures of support for the creation of new companies via credit facilities, 
agencies of  council, etc.:  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
47 •  other supporting measures that you envisage: -------------------------------------------------------------------
Example:  a specific training structure will be necessary if  the  objective is  to  create jobs for low-qualified 
unemployed people through the development of  services requiring certain qualifications. 
48 VIII. Institutional framework and other relevant structures already in existence 
If the  mechanism  covers  an  existing  range  of services,  we  wish  here  to  have  a  vision  of the 
organisation  of services  concerned  before  its  introduction,  and  whether  they  benefit  from  this 
mechanism, or not (even potentially). 
In this heading, distinguish according to fields of  service as necessary. 
The First Type of  Service Discussed 
24. Within which institutional framework are the services concerned registered? 
24.1. Organisation's level: 
•  national: 
•  regional: 
•  local: 
•  company: 
S  pee  icy if  necessary:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
24.2. Which institution(s) are responsible for the regulation and for the financing of  these services(  a 
ministry, a semi-public body, a company, etc.)? 
Specicy : ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
24.3. Other information regarding the institutional framework if  necessary : 
o are t  e servtce provt  ers mvo ve  m o  enng t  ese servtces.  necessary, a so mention t  e 
existence of  examples belonging to the informal sphere (on the black economy or within the family): 
•  Public organisation: 
•  Private company with a profit motive: 
•  Organisation of  social economy (associations, mutual societies, co-operatives, etc.): 
•  Black economy: 
•  Family sphere: 
•  Other: 
Spec  icy if  necessary : -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example: child care in Belgium is currently ensured by a multiplicity of  service providers,  at the same time 
(association creches), without counting an  important share of  these services that is  in the black economy or 
within the family. 
26. What are the types of financing-apart from the studied mechanism- used for these services, 
whether public or private ? : -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. Does the studied mechanism replace these types of financing or can it be used to augment them? 
If  so, specicy in which proportions or according to which methods. 
Example: certain child care services combine public subsidies with private funding on the part of  the service 
provider,  others are entirely privately financed  One can imagine that the introduction of  a matched service 
voucher of  an important subsidy  is  accompanied by the  suppression of the  current subsidies  that creches 
receive, like those covering the operating costs. 
Other Type(s) of  Service(s) Mentioned 
If  you distinguish between various types of  services, refer to questions 24 to 27 in the space below. 
49 IX. Results and evaluation 
If the consumption subsidy mechanism is a proposal, answer the following questions according to 
your estimates. 
28. What are the observed or awaited results of  the measure at the following levels : 
•  number created jobs (in equivalent full-time, in worked hours, etc.):-------------------------------------
•  composition  of these  jobs  (full-time,  part-time;  qualified  work  or  not;  independents, 
employees or unemployed; etc.) : 
•  number and composition of  service providers : 
•  other indicators of  the extent of  the measure (number of  emitted vouchers, etc.) : ---------------------
•  distribution of  the use of  the mechanism between the various proposed services : ---------------------
•  cost for public finance. As far as possible, distinguish the rough cost of the measure and 
the net cost of this measure in view of the economies induced, inter alia by the creation 
employment : 
29. Does the mechanism make it possible to avoid the induced effects and/or gaps following? 
Answer by "yes", "no" or "no idea", and explain whenever necessary. 
- In the field of  the response to the needs : 
•  anti-redistributive effects connected with the selected mechanism :  -------------------------------------
•  low quality of  the services :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
•  weak structuring of  supply -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
•  low capacity of  adaptation of  supply to the diversity of  demands : ---------------------------------------
•  inadequate choice at the level of  the consumed services and of  the service providers :  ---------------
In the field of  the employment policy : 
•  'wasted bonus' effect (i.e. to subsidise a service which would have been consumed without 
this subsidy, so that the subsidy does not give rise to a net creation of  employment): -----------------
•  effect of substitution (i.e. the subsidised service replaces an existing service so that this 
subsidy does not lead to a net creation of  employment): ---------------------------------------------------
•  attraction of  unemployed (increase in the rate of  activity):  ------------------------------------------------
•  development of a secondary labour market (dualisation) with few bridges towards other 
forms of  employment :  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Do you identify different effects induced that are both negative and positive to mention here? If so, 
explain: 
30. What are the limiting obstacles encountered? 
50 
•  in the event of massive success of the mechanism, what are the budgetary constraints (on 
the  side of subsidising) or those  connected with the  development of supply which are 
likely to limit capacity to satisfy demand for these services (thus creating rationing which 
would result in a price rise)?:  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
•  does the mechanism enter into competition with, or threaten, other existing measures?---------------
•  does the introduction of  this measure meet resistance both from the political point of view 
and from the point of view of the potential service providers and consumers (refusals to 
com  p  1  y, cultural blocking, etc.)? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
•  do different elements seem important to you? ---------------------------------------------------------------X. Conclusion 
31. At the end of  this questionnaire, how do you justify the choice of  your mechanism in particular, 
in preference to other possible mechanisms (subsidies to production for example) to encourage the 
development of  the household services? 
32. Carry out, if possible, a short explanatory assessment of the implementation (real or simulated) 
of  the mechanism: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
XI. Preliminary studies and bibliographical references 
3  3. Was your mechanism the object of  preliminary studies? If  so, specify in nature. 
34. Please mention here your possible bibliographical references : 
51 ANNEX 3:  LIST OF THE STUDIED SCHEMES 
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•  Service vouchers for child care intended to develop a private (profit-making or non-profit-
making) child care supply. OX
2
> 
•  Service voucher allowing those caring informally for dependent persons to call upon outside 




•  Cheque-emploi-service:  scheme  to  simplify  the  administrative  formalities  on  households 
employing home care and in particular household service providers, supplemented by a tax 
allowance for households making use of  the scheme. OX
2
> 
•  Titre-emploi-service: granted by a works council or an enterprise, together with enterprise aid 
to encourage the consumption of  personal services. (IX
2
> 
•  Cheque-Prestation:  voucher  issued  by  Age  d'Or  Services  for  services  to  help  elderly  or 
disabled people, such as escort services or meals on wheels. (I) 
Germany 
•  Dependency insurance which includes a subsidy for home services for dependent persons. OX
2
> 
















Scheme presented at seminar II.  SEMINAIRE- PRESENTATION OF THE SCHEMES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
II.l  Introduction : 
What is the place of  local services or which systems are needed for which policies? 
Jean-Fran~ois LEBRUN 
Directorate-General V, European Commission 
It is only in the last two or three years that employment policies have included issues connected with 
local services. The central position that these issues have acquired in the debate on employment is in 
keeping with European Commission action since December 1993.  The first component of  Community 
action was undoubtedly the White Paper on "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment". 
Since then, at the Essen European Council at the end of 1994, the Heads of State and Government 
stated that local services were one of the key areas around which the multi-annual employment plans 
that States have undertaken to submit should be structured. 
It is possible to try to estimate the importance attached to local services by analysing the multi-annual 
employment plans formulated  in  1995.  It should be  noted,  in  the first  instance,  that local  services 
account for some 10% of  all measures. 
It is also interesting to note that the largest number of  new measures is to be found in this field (55o/o in 
comparison with an average of39%). 
An examination of the policies that support and frame the development of local services shows that 
these policies have evolved over time. 
Before the 1980s. priority was giyen to measures of  a general type intended to support global demand. 
These  were  measures  to  raise  wages,  to  increase  welfare  pensions  and  to  lower  taxation.  These 
measures had relatively limited effects on local services largely because they were not targeted. Far 
less  use  is  nowadays  made  of this  kind  of measure,  in  some  cases  largely  for  reasons  of 
competitiveness and in other cases for budgetary reasons.  The only component of general measures 
still to be found involves the macro-economic framework where it is hoped that wage restraint will 
make it possible to reduce prices in industrial sectors through productivity increases that are higher 
than wage increases. Reducing prices in this way makes it possible to increase purchasing power and 
therefore to use this increase to purchase services where productivity gains have not been so high. 
A  number  of local  services  have  also  been  developed  in  connection  with  the  public  or  social 
authorities. For budgetary reasons and for other reasons connected with the very nature of some local 
services, States have not been very keen, however, to produce these services directly. 
Since the 1980s, there has been a shift away from general policies focusin2 on demand towards SlJl1ply-
side policies and policies to return the unemployed to work, in particular in the form of recruitment 
incentives intended to offset their lower productivity. Many policies to develop local services have for 
this reason forged direct links with the fight against unemployment. 
54 Under these  measures  it  is  possible  to  recruit  unemployed  people  who  qualify  for  subsidies  or 
reductions of social  security contributions, thereby  promoting the development of the  business  by 
reducing the cost of  labour.  This type of  policy has, however, a number of  limits connected with: 
•  the personal development of the workers employed and the  image associated with 
such activities.  People speak of "menial jobs" because "they are done by unemployed 
people". 
•  the  development  of  the  service  provided,  in  particular  because  training  and 
professional development are lacking. 
•  the creation of durable employment, since the operation is only viable as long as the 
worker is eligible for a subsidy.  When this person is no longer eligible for a subsidy, 
he or she very often leaves the business and a new person eligible for a subsidy is 
recruited. 
Emplo_yment  policies now seem to  be  starting to moye towards targeting on  activities,  combining 
demand-side measures, rather than on workers.  Service vouchers and consumer subsidies for some 
activities are examples of  this.  Further examples are those welfare benefits that are paid in kind and are 
therefore targeted on certain kinds of service, such as the dependency allowance system for elderly 
people  in  Germany.  Some taxation  policies  intended to  increase  the  consumption taxes  on  some 
products or services (such as packagings or disposal) are part and parcel of  these measures targeted on 
consumption as they modify economic market conditions. 
This  development  is  not  without  links  with  the  Commission's  philosophy  on the  supervision  of 
employment aid.  The  Commission  notes  in  its  guidelines14  that  "employment aid  in  respect of 
activities that do not involve trade between Member States (e.g. neighbourhood care services, certain 
local employment initiatives) does not fall within the scope of  Article 92" (Aids granted by States). 
In its inquiry report on local development and employment initiatives in Europe15, the Commission 
has also stressed that service vouchers could be a very advantageous way of stimulating the supply of 
and demand for  new services,  by creating a  reference  price  and  making  it easier for  new service 
providers to gain a foothold without discrimination based on their legal status. 
Since 1993, many experiments have take place in the Member States.  Each has its own characteristics 
and is  in  keeping with the objectives that governments have chosen on the  basis of their national 
cultural, economic and social contexts. 
It now seems to be a good moment to draw the first lessons from  these policies, to understand the 
content of programmes, to compare results and, possibly, to enable other countries to profit from the 
good practice highlighted by exchanges at European level. 
14 OJ of 12.12.95 C/334/5. 
15 SEC(95)564- OJ of 12.10.95 C/265/03. 
55 11.2  Existing national schemes 
112.1  Objective "Improving the quality of  life" 
11.2.1.1  Service vouchers  in  child  day care. a  national experiment in Finland  1995-1997  -
Matti HEIKKILA. 
Director in  the National  Research  and Development Centre  for  Welfare  and Health (STAKES). 
(Helsinki. Finland) 
Some background notes 
Finland applies the Scandinavian type welfare model which has several implications in relation to 
any market-based attempts in service provision. 
(1)  Welfare services tend to be universalistic by their nature, i.e. they are meant and provided 
for all citizens in need, not only for the worst-off. For that reason, services are mainly public 
and based on  firm  legislation.  Income-testing is  not applied when deciding who will be 
entitled to get service. This principle of universalism covers e.g.  home help, elderly care, 
health services as well as child and family services. 
(2)  Public  sector,  i.e.  local  municipalities have  at the  moment a  clear monopoly  in  service 
provision. Services are thus financed from general taxes. There are no real market relations 
and competition in welfare provision. 
(3)  Services are mainly free for clients. Fees are  low,  sometimes income-related. This means 
that the whole service sector is heavily subsidized. 
This public production model is deeply rooted in the Finnish imagination of  welfare. Public model is 
also seen as a very legitimate mode even when the fiscal problems emerged. People are ready to 
finance high quality services by their tax burden. 
All this applies also to the relative comprehensive child day care complex. Local municipalities are 
obliged to provide day care for all children under seven years of  age in case the parents are in work, 
studying, etc. The labour force participation of women with minor children is high, i.e. about 80%. 
Hence well-organised day care is also the interest of production life. From the beginning of 1996 
families got a clear law-based subjective right to get public day care for their children in case of 
need. 
About the context 
Two things are of special importance when trying to understand the relative meaning of  the national 
experiment. 
Firstly, attempts to introduce any market-related models into the welfare service sectors are quite 
controversial  - and  political  in  the  Finnish  attitude  climate.  Quasi-market  arrangements  like 
purchasing-providing models, service vouchers and other related solutions will very likely equated 
with  more  ideological  neo-liberal  shifts  in  the  traditional  system.  In this  context  one  has  also 
recognise the strong potential interests of the vast public employment in  the welfare sector.  The 
slight increase in the public interest towards consumerism, new forms of managerialism and to any 
kind of public-private mixes took place during the previous conservative-agrarian government when 
the whole political left was in opposition. 
Secondly, as to the explicit objectives of voucher experiments the aim to create more jobs into the 
private welfare sector (i.e. entrepreneurship) was not the central one. On the other hand any attempts 
56 to create cheaper service provision and before all reduce the public costs were seen essential. Lower 
unit costs,  better cost-quality ratio and  more flexibility  and  responsiveness  are  seen as the most 
important merits  of vouche~-run production of traditional  social  services.  The  local  government 
(municipalities) clearly needed new,  flexible  and rapid models  in  trying to  respond to the rising 
legitimate need for additional day care places from the beginning of 1996. 
The national experiment 
Ministry  of social  welfare  and  health  initiated  the  nation-wide-3-year  experiment  of service 
vouchers in 1995. 33 of  the total460 municipalities announced their willingness to take part. 
Municipalities are free to decide about the mode as well as about the monetary value of  the voucher 
offered for families in need of the day care. The central norm in the experiment was however that 
the private caregivers/providers (private family day care and kindergartens) should meet the same 
qualification criteria  16  which applied to public providers. Local authorities are obliged to inspect 
and approve the private providers of care before giving the voucher. It is the duty of  families to find 
the proper providers in the market before applying for the voucher. 
Two thirds of  municipalities chose income-related voucher model whereas one third (including also 
some biggest cities) adopted vouchers with equal value for all families,  rich and poor. This fixed 
voucher model together with free (market) prices is closest to the "genuine" market model. Here the 
redistributive  element  is  not  any  more  present.  This  is  important  to  see  because  a  strong 
redistributive tendency in an inbuilt element not only in benefits but also in many universal services 
in Finland. 
Indirectly the local governments control not only voucher values but also the prices remaining for 
families responsability in the income-related voucher model, but not in the fixed model. 
The value of  voucher varied according to the type of  day care provided (family day care, day homes) 
as well as according to the age of  the child. 
The  evaluation  of the  experiment  was  commissioned  from  STAKES.  Result  and  conclusions 
presented in this paper are from the interim report by authors, dated April 24, 1996. 
Voucher theory and anticipated impacts 
According  to  the  voucher  theory  (see  e.g.  Parker,  M.D.,  1989)  enhanced  consumer's choice 
(demand support17) together with increased competition are apt to produce positive changes in the 
market. These positive changes are seen in the price of care (decreases), supply of care (increases) 
as well as in the quality of care (improves). Along the lines of this theory we focused our study on 
the following key issues: 
•  cost reductions (cost of  the municipality, i.e. public expenditures plus family costs); 
•  responsiveness of  new private provision; 
•  consumer choice; and 
16  These norms concern mostly the formal training of staff and the staff/children number ratio by age of 
children. 
17  In the voucher model demand support means increased and fixed (by purpose) purchasing power given to 
families by local authorities. 
57 •  quality of  care 
To a more limited degree we examined also the job creative impact of  the voucher system. 
About the costs two requirements should basically be met. 
58 The voucher system is advantageous to the local government if: 
value of  the  gross unit cost 
voucher  <  in public day 
care 
max. user fee in 
public care 
Respectively choosing a voucher instead of public day care option is advantageous for the family in 
case. 
actual user fee 
in the public 
system 
> 
gross unit cost 
of  private day 
care 
value of  voucher 
granted 
The quality of day care was measured by identical scales both in  public day care and within the 
voucher-driven system. Research design was thus comparative adapting subjective user evaluation. 
The concept of quality was operationalised into five main components comprising altogether about 
ten items. In addition the "objective" quality was controlled by the number of  children per qualified 
staff-ratio norm. 
On results 
1.  Change-oyer 
Taking into account the assumptions about the cost reductions for families we were interested in 
seeing whether and to what degree families actually changed systems, i.e.  moved out from the 
public system and preferred the voucher system. 
The transition was  17% which probably is  smaller than was anticipated. About one half of all 
families that had chosen the voucher remained in their existing, i.e. previous care arrangement. 
This implies that a big deal of  families having being outside the public system now were able to 
benefit the voucher option in reducing their total care costs. Some 28% of all voucher children 
came into the system from home care. 
What about the possibility to create new jobs/entrepreneurship by the voucher system? More than 
one fifth of  all private day care entrepreneurs financed by the voucher experiment was given rise 
by the voucher. This share can be regarded as remarkable if  also as relatively modest. 
2.  Reasons to choose a voucher 
Families were asked about their explicit reasons to choose the private, voucher-run option instead 
of  the public alternative. 
Somehow surprinsigly 22.4% families reported a non-option, i.e ..  the private care was the only 
choice. Traditional reasons to be derived from the market theory (better responsiveness, better 
quality, etc) were reported by 28% of  the families. 
In 22% of  cases the pedagogical speciality of  the private option was the first priority. 
3.  Quality 
The traditional theory suggests an increase in quality of service provided if the real competition 
will be allowed. In the Finnish experimentation the public sector was in fact protected from the 
competition. In addition the study reported here was based on only one cross sectional survey. 
Hence we were not able to control any dynamic change. Bearing these restrictions in mind the 
following results were obtained about quality comparisons between public and private, voucher-
run day care: 
in general the perceived (subjective) quality was better in the private than public sector; 
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child,  children's  positive  experiences,  stimulative  action  as  well  as  good  cooperation 
between home/family and the care giving unit; and 
the  superiority  in  quality  of  private  provision  was  most  obvious  in  day  homes 
(kindergartens); especially pedagogically specialised units were appreciated by parents. 
It is still worth mentionning that better quality feed-back of private, voucher subsidised day care 
can not simply be  explained as  a consequence  of the  voucher as  such.  There are  reasons  to 
assume that the voucher as a new input to the market led to a kind of selection effect, i.e. the 
highest quality supply of  the existing private day care pool came into the semi-public funding. 
Anyhow,  interesting is  also  the  finding  that almost all  private  providers also met the  formal 
minimum norm of  child/staff-criterium. 
4.  CQru 
As we mentioned earlier the local government makes savings in  its extra service supply if the 
monetary value of voucher is fixed lower than the net expenditure of the public provision (unit 
cost). To meet this requirement is a quite simple and administrative procedure. 
We as evaluators examined the running costs of public day care by the form of care (day homes 
plus family day care) in each municipality taking part in the voucher experiment. Thus simply by 
comparing the values of vouchers to the net unit costs (  =  gross minus user fees)  in the public 
provision one can see the cost-saving merits of voucher model. And the result was clear, in all 
municipalities the value of voucher was lower than public net unit cost. Thus a clear conclusion 
is that local (public) cost savings will be reached. 
What  about  private  households?  Are  they  then  behaving  as  "rational  consumers"  as  was 
supposed? The condition of rationality would be fulfilled if only those families had chosen the 
private,  voucher supported option,  whose fee  in  the public  system  was  higher than the  "free 
price", i.e. the fee after the voucher in the market. This assumption was not possible to be tested 
from the evaluation data. However an interesting observation was that almost one fifth ( 19%) of 
voucher families was in fact paying for their (private) day care more than the maximum fee  ( 1 
430 FIM I child I month) in the public sector.  This was surprising. What do families do such 
choices? A partial response to this question was the pedagogical specialisation of  the service they 
preferred. About one half of families paying after voucher more than the public maximum were 
users of  specialised day home services (Montessori, language, music etc pedagogics). 
Conclusions 
1.  The Finnish voucher model in child care provision is a limited model in the sense that at least so 
far the public sector is protected from a real competition. 
2.  The employment, i.e. extra jobs-creating effect of the experiment has until now been moderate: 
some 22% of  all private providers of  care were new beginners due to the voucher system. 
3.  The movement from public to private, voucher-subsidised day care was some 17%. Most of the 
family  preferences to  change the  system  were  dealing  with  better responsiveness  and  higher 
quality of  private care. 
4.  The quality of the private, voucher supported day care was in general seen better than that of the 
public care. It was however not possible to demonstrate whether this was a consequence of the 
experiment as itself or of  a selection process. 
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provide  day care  services than  public  provision.  For families  as  clients  the  demand of cost-
reduction is a more contradictory issue. What is clear is that the lower is the value of  voucher the 
higher is the family price in the market. 
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61 II 2.1.2  The Finnish experiment of vouchers in informal home care of elderly, disabled and 
long term ill persons -
Marja V  AARAMA. Ph.D., 
STAKES (National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health). Helsinki. Finland 
Introduction 
In Finland, the local authorities, i.e.  municipalities are obliged to provide the necessary social and 
health care services for their inhabitants. Provision of care has been heavily based on public action. 
Usually the  primary health  care  is  provided by joint councils  of municipalities,  and  specialized 
health care by hospital districts. Until last few years the social services have been provided mainly 
by individual municipalities. Social and health care services are funded mainly by tax revenues, and 
user's co-payment has been of smaller importance. The allocation of care has been based on the 
principle of  universalism. 
Since the recession, which the country has been facing since 1991, the provision has become more 
pluralistic, and a shift from traditional Scandinavian welfare model sees to be going on. However, 
even in the "golden years" of the Scandinavian model with extensive public services, the informal 
care at home had an important role to play in the Finnish society. Especially importatn is the care of 
the elderly. According to some research, about 70 percent of external help needed by the elderly is 
given by relatives, friends or neighbours. Until recession the informal care had a neglected role, but 
during last few years lot of expectations has been put in this care sector. To encourage pluralisation 
of  the care markets new incentives have been implemented, and various projects to find out practical 
strategies  to  promote  the  pluralism  in  service  provision  has  been  started.  The  experiment  on 
vouchers  in  informal care of elderly,  disabled  and  long term  ill  is  one  example of this  type of 
projects. 
Finland has a long tradition to support care at home in financial terms. However, only a minority of 
informal  carers  has  got  access  to  this  social  service.  The  major  problem  has  been  the  unequal 
allocation of  this form of home care support. This arise from the fact, that local authorities interpret 
the legislation differently, resulting to  implementation of highly varying local policy for informal 
care.  The  nation-wide  study  in  1994  (Antikainen  &  Vaarama  1995)  demonstrated  the  unequal 
treatment of informal carers clearly. This study was ordered by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health. 
Since 1993  a new legislation for comprehensive home care scheme was introduced in the country. 
The above mentioned follow-up study suggests, that the status of  informal carers has been improved 
by implementation of new policy and rules. However, a clear problem can be specified: the lack of 
respite care rendering possible for the informal carers to have care-leave at least occasionally if not 
regularly. The problem arise on the one hand from lacking resources, but also from poor possibilities 
for carer to choice between different respite care forms for their caretakers on the other hand. These 
were among the reasons for Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health to initiate an experiment 
on vouchers for organising respite care for elderly, disabled and long term ill persons cared at home 
by an informal carer. 
The project seek to: 
1.  catch information and experiments on 
a) how usable vouchers are in organizing care-leave for relatives caring long term ill patients at 
home; and 
b)  which type  of price  mechanism  are  used  in  municipals  and  organisations  involved  in the 
project 
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3.  support establishing of  different local modes of  function in using the vouchers 
4.  find out which would be the suitable level of  supervision in this type of  functioning. 
Even if it  is  quite clear, that the experiment may contribute  in  encouragement of private service 
production or self-employment in the care sector, the starting point for the experiments with service 
vouchers is not related to employment policy. The main aims of  the project are to promote the status 
of informal carers for ensuring the continuity of care, and to increase the clients' freedom of choice 
by creating market-based service systems besides the public services.  A more diversified service 
market is also expected to result in cost savings for public economy. 
From home care allowance to informal care allowance 
Since 1984 caring for the disabled, the elderly and patients needing long term care at home has been 
supported by law in Finland. In  1993  the law was revised. The new comprehensive informal care 
scheme is more extensive than previous home care allowance. The informal care allowance can be 
granted as money, services of  both which are specified in a personal care and service plan. 
The law sets the minimum of the allowance 1116 FIM a month (1.1.1996). The rate depends on the 
time and the extent of assistance required.  The informal care allowance can be  given if a person 
because of lowered capacity, sickness, disability or other similar reasons needs care that is possible 
to arrange at the care-taker's home by entering into an agreement with care-taker's relatives. 
An informal carer is a person who takes care of an older, disabled or sick family member or other 
person close to him/her in that person's home. The carer does not have to be care-taker's relative. 
The informal carer is entitled to an allowance for home care from the municipality. The municipality 
should also arrange time off  for the carer by providing care for the care-taker during the leave of  the 
permanent carer.  The  purpose of the  system  is  to  prevent bum-out among  informal  carers.  The 
carer's entitlement to the leave should be graded on the basis of how binding and/or demanding the 
care provided is. 
The goals of  the revised home care allowance are: 
1.  To  improve the position of the  informal care and to  combine  it to the  social and health care 
service system. 
2.  To improve the position of  the informal carer: 
the  informal  carer  who  is  not  in  pension  is  covered  by  national  pension  plan. 
to increase the level of  the home care allowance (financial). 
By recommending time off for the carer. 
The  informal care allowance  is  always based on a personal care and service plan.  The  care and 
service plan reinforces the care aspect in the allowance and combines it to the care-taker's service 
scheme. 
The contract is  always  signed  between the  informal  carer and  municipality.  The contract should 
include the following subjects: 
1.  The fee of  the informal carer and how it is paid. 
2.  Agreements on how the fee is paid when home care is interrupted. 
3.  How to arrange the time off  for the carer. 
64 4.  How to cancel the contract. 
5.  Other possible things (A 318/1993 1§). 
65 Service voucher experiment to arrange free time for informal carers 
According to Antikainem &  Vaarama ( 1995), the municipalities have not succeeded in  arranging 
time off for the informal carers to  a sufficient extent. The care experiment with service vouchers 
aims at new solutions in providing free time for carers. The goal of  the experiment is to improve the 
conditions of informal care so that the continuity and  quality of the service can be  safeguarded; 
providing  time  off for  those  providing  care  of demanding  character  is  seen  as  an  important 
supportive measure. 
Altogether  twenty  municipalities  are  participating  in  the  experiment  with  service  vouchers  for 
informal  care;  both  large  towns  and  small  municipalities.  The  experiment  is  carried  out  in 
cooperation between municipalities, non governmental organizations for welfare and health care in 
the  Finnish  Slot  Machine  Association  so  that  the  municipality  grants  the  care-taker  a  service 
voucher by means of  which he or she can buy the necessary service from a private service producer 
while  the  regular  carer  is  off.  Non-governmental  social  welfare  and  health  care  organizations 
produce the services of  support arranging them. 
The National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health performs a follow-up study 
concerning the  experiment.  The  study  aims  to  analyse  and  model  different  local  strategies  and 
modes of action, including the price mechanisms and model contracts between public and private 
sector. Also impacts on local service markets and on mixed economy of care will be evaluated, and 
prices of  public and private provision compared. One important dimension in the study is quality of 
care. Special attention will be paid to this. 
First measurement has been made, but not yet analysed. In this measurement, a unique data from all 
informal carers in the participating municipalities has been collected. Thus, also analysis of  potential 
markets of service vouchers in this client group is possible to do. The draft report will be published 
next autumn. 
66 II.2. 1.3  The INSERSO social tourism programme in Spain -
Jesus Norberto Fernandez MUNoz, 
Subdirector General del INSERSO (National Institute of  Scoial Services (Madrid. Spain) 
The programme of  holidays for the elderly (PVTA) run by INSERSO (the National Institute for Social 
Services)  is  part  of the  Ministry  of Labour  and  Social  Affairs'  move  to  promote  more  active 
participation by the elderly in a society in which medium-term demographic developments will mean 
an increase in the number of elderly people and in the responsibilities they will be called upon to 
assume. 
An expanding programme 
The programme is  intended to improve the quality of life and generate wealth creation. PVTA was 
launched in 1985 with 16 000 participants, and has expanded to accommodate 360 000 places for the 
1995/96 season. 
The increase has been not only in the number of places available, but also in the number of hotels 
participating (rising from  19 to 183), the number of  travel agencies involved (rising from 20 to 2 000) 
and the number of  people travelling by air (rising from 11 000 to 245 000). 
Since its  commencement, over one and a half million people  have been able to take advantage of 
holidays offered by INSERSO. 
Beginning as a series of one-off holidays for the elderly around the Christmas period, the programme 
today has a considerable influence on the tourism sector (hotels, transport, travel agencies, etc.) and 
indirectly on other sectors, such as commerce in the tourist areas (due not only to the presence of  the 
elderly holiday-makers but also to the fact that, thanks to the programme, employers and employees 
can continue their activities throughout the year). 
Social impact 
The programme enables retired people with little disposable income to spend one or two-week holidays 
in  tourist areas  with  a temperate  climate  (Balearic  Islands,  Valencia,  Andalusia,  the  Canaries  and 
Murcia) in low season from October to May. 
Sociological studies have enabled us to draw up  a standard profile of PVTA beneficiaries, who are 
likely to be aged 65 to 70 travelling with a partner (household), from an urban area, and with a monthly 
income of between 55 000 and  100 000  pesetas. Year by year, however, the number of participants 
from rural areas with an income lower than 55 000 pesetas is  increasing, prompted by the active role 
played by local councils in providing information and subsidies. 
The general level of satisfaction according to INSERSO's sociological studies shows over 91% of the 
holiday-makers to be very or quite satisfied. This is consistent with the high proportion returning, 98% 
expressing an interest in using the programme again in subsequent seasons. 
Economic impact 
The programme has a strong impact on seasonal employment which, when combined with its impact 
on the target regions and the tax revenue it generates for the State, makes the PVTA highly profitable. 
According to the special monitoring committees set up by INSERSO, the programme has been directly 
responsible for the creation of  4 100 jobs a year, and indirectly responsible for a further 21 000. 
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the  programme  (Ptas  6 000  million  for  the  1993/94  season)  through  taxation  (income  tax,  VAT, 
corporation tax,  etc.),  social  security contributions,  the  saving  on  unemployment  benefits  and  the 
provision of  certain business services to public companies. 
A study recently published by Price Waterhouse shows that the Ptas 6 000 million spent by INSERSO 
generate a market of Ptas 26 000 million,  including around Ptas 7 000 million paid by the holiday-
makers participating in the programme and Ptas 13 500 million spent by them on optional excursions, 
purchases, etc. 
Recent improvements to the programme 
Each year, as the number of  places has increased, many improvements have been made to upgrade the 
quality of the  system,  some  paid for  by  INSERSO  and  others  by the  companies  selected  for  the 
programme: 
•  Over the past few seasons, the Social Affairs Ministry has opened the programme to elderly 
Spaniards  residing  in  other  European  and  Latin  American  countries.  During  the  1993/94 
season, the PVTA enabled 7 000 elderly persons residing in Germany, Belgium, France, the 
United  Kingdom,  the  Netherlands,  Switzerland  and  Russia,  and  a  further  3 400  from 
Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, to participate. 
•  Cooperation by the local authorities in the form  of grants for people with a low disposable 
income has enabled elderly people from all sectors of  society to benefit from the programme. 
•  The number of  sales outlets has increased, rising from a single agency in 1985 to 600 agencies 
in 1990-91 and 2 000 in 1993-94. 
•  A computerised management system has been set up for the sales outlets, enabling the travel 
agencies concerned to reserve places on-line, thereby guaranteeing immediate confirmation 
and automatic issue of  tickets and providing a better service for the client. 
•  Load transfers have been eliminated on most road transport routes. 
•  Two  new destinations  - the  Canary Islands  and  Minorca - have  been  added  since  1994, 
including cultural tours. 
•  INSERSO tourism consultants carry out monitoring to  check the quality of services, and a 
complaints system and suggestions box have been set up for the programme users. 
•  Sociological studies are carried out regularly to establish the degree of  satisfaction. 
•  There is increasing cooperation with the Autonomous Communities in the configuration and 
development of  this State-run programme. 
•  Special PVT  A monitoring committees have been set up (comprising representatives of the 
administrative  authorities,  trade  unions  and  employers,  plus  representatives of the  holiday 
companies selected, who attend meetings but have no vote). They are responsible for: 
monitoring existing jobs in the hotels participating in the programme; 
inspecting any new recruitment; 
making recommendations to  INSERSO's Directorate-General for the  suspension  or 
removal  from  the  programme of hotels which  do  not comply with the  established 
requirements; 
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particularly in respect of  their general operation; and presentation of the employment 
adjustment records for the period of  their participation in the programme; 
checking compliance with objectives in respect of quality of service and job creation 
in the hotel and catering sector. 
Future prospects 
INSERSO is currently finalising its tendering procedure for the PVTA 1996/1997 season. The ceiling 
for maximum impact of  the programme is based on seasonal tourism demand, low-season reduction in 
employment (the PVTA is taken to represent 40% of  low-season tourism) and available hotel capacity. 
This ceiling is around 1.1 million places. 
Further factors in the success of the programme are its interregional nature and its capacity to have a 
beneficial impact across the board Gob creation, improvement of  quality of life, etc.), and the linking of 
the  selection of destinations to a more  general  policy.  This  illustrates the advantages  for  users  of 
centralising management and coordination of  the programme at national level. 
70 11.2.1.4  Dependency insurance in Germany -
Dirk FINGER, 
Berlin  Centre  of Sciences  for  the  sociolo~ical  research  Department  of labour  market  and 
employment (Berlin. Germany) 
The dependency insurance scheme was established on 1 January 1995 and brought into operation on 1 
June 1995. 
Substantial demand from households in Germany for home care services warranted the introduction of 
such a scheme. In 1995, it was estimated that 1.2 million households were involved. In addition, almost 
4 million people would potentially be in need of home help. Those targeted by dependency insurance 
are not only the elderly but all physically dependent people, and more specifically the disabled. 
1.  The scheme - the activities and the beneficiary targeted 
The  dependency  insurance  scheme  was  brought  into  force  under Volume  II  of the  law  on  social 
problems and will be put into effect in two stages: 
The first stage, currently under way, relates to the financing of home care. Theoretically, 700 
000 persons are concerned by this measure, which enables the number of existing services already 
provided under the Federal law on social aid to be increased. The amount of  the allowance is also fixed 
on the basis of the type of accommodation. Thus dependent persons living  in  convalescent homes, 
retirement homes or establishments for the disabled are entitled to these services on condition that the 
treatment is given in the dwelling place itself (500 000 concerned). This is an entirely new scheme for 
Germany because it involves financing home care with a view to well-being. 
Lastly, it is a measure to relieve some degree of unemployment, although the primary purpose of  the 
scheme is to satisfy requirements linked to home medical care. 
A second stage is planned to come into effect in the summer of 1996; it relates to treatment 
prescribed by hospitals or other medical care establishments. 
The level of  services provided under this dependency insurance scheme will depend on the quantity of 
contributions paid into the scheme. Each citizen covered by social security in Germany automatically 
contributes to the dependency insurance scheme unless he is insured with a private fund ( 1% of total 
gross income). This compulsory contribution is co-financed by employee and employer. 
•  Entitlement to  services  under  the  dependency  insurance  scbeme  is  on  the  basis  of three 
cate~ories of  dependence: 
the first category covers care requirements which can be met in over one and a half hours once 
a day; 
the second category is for people who need home help three times a day; 
the third category is for those who need to be looked after 24 hours a day. 
•  The dependency insurance scheme makes provision for two types of  services: 
services in kind provided by a body specializing in home care (the amount of  help towards this 
kind of  service varies from ECU 400 to ECU 1 000 per month); 
or  a  sum  in  cash  (a  money  allowance)  paid  directly  to  the  people  who  are  themselves 
responsible for organizing and managing home care (the amount of  help provided for this kind 
of  service varies between ECU 250 and ECU 500 per month). 
The amount of the dependency insurance is not very high:  if it is considered that the hourly cost of 
home services in Berlin is almost DM 50 per hour, the new scheme provides enough to pay for approx. 
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most heavily dependent cases. 
•  Institutional structure of  the insurance 
This insurance scheme is managed using the old institutional framework. Dependency  insurance funds 
have been newly set up but they are attached to the traditional sickness insurance funds.  The service 
providers are already existing bodies such as the large medical care associations or private service 
providers. The latter must be kept under constant supervision in this case. A dependent person must 
check that a  contract has  in  fact  been  concluded  between the  body providing the  care  and the 
dependency insurance fund. 
Under the scheme care provided at home by members of  the family or others are monitored by doctors 
who work for the new institution and who are responsible for checking that the measures are applied. 
2.  Results 
The  dependency  insurance  scheme cannot be  seen  as  a  cheque  for  a  local  service  since  it  is  not 
compulsory to involve a third party. It  is only a means of  financing professional care and the results can 
only be understood in that context. 
As a result of  the new scheme, a real market has emerged in the medical care sector, notably through 
the advent of new private service providers (the number of which has reportedly doubled in certain 
regions) alongside the large medical care associations which are in a dominant position. In addition, it 
has allowed dependent families to purchase this type of care on a true market by enabling them to 
compare prices (giving them freedom of  choice). 
Dependency insurance is a subsidy. It does not set out to cover all existing requirements in the area of 
home care, but to provide a minimum level of  help towards meeting part of  those requirements. 
However, practical experience of  the scheme has proved disappointing, as it has been found that 80% 
of the recipients opt for the cash allowance, that is to say, dependent persons choose to manage their 
care themselves.  As  a  result there  is  a  danger that the  grant will  not necessarily  go  towards  the 
consumption of  medical care, which is what it was set up for. 
This new scheme makes it more difficult for the least dependent category to gain access to care since it 
replaces a number of existing financial arrangements: to benefit fully from the grant, a person must 
need care for at least 90 minutes per day. 
At present, there are no statistics on the number of  jobs created by the scheme. 
73 11.2.1.5  Nursery Vouchers in the U.K. -
Professor Mike CAMPBELL, 
Policy Research InstiMe. Leeds Metropolitan University (Leeds. United Kingdom) 
1. The Scheme 
•  Vouchers worth £1.100 per year to fund a place (for 3 terms) for all 4 year olds whose parents 
wish it in the pre-school education. 
•  Experimentally launched in 4 areas from  1 April  1996 - Nationwide from  1 April  1997 - it is 
aimed to provide 150.000 additional places. 
•  Total cost £545 million "recycled" from LEA funding of  4 year olds. 
•  Emission of vouchers worth £5  million for 4500 additional places (total cost of £22 million for 
estimated 15.600 4 year olds- 4500 of  which have no nursery place- most of  remainder pays for 
existing  11.000 places).  Estimates for  Kensington/Chelsea suggest 55% take up  for vouchers. 
Norfolk 92% overall around 80%. 
•  5 vouchers are given (one for each day) each term. 
•  An inspection has to be realised (£20 million available) through OFSTED- adverts just out for 
new inspectors.  All  providers must meet minimum  standards but may operate  in  advance of 
inspection. 
•  Currently (pre-voucher))- Overall 77% participation rate but very uneven provision eg. 27% in 
Oxfordshire, 95% in Knowsley. 
•  The jobs Effect, may be estimated very roughly at 18.000 jobs (inc. inspectors) 
2. Some Considerations 
•  This  scheme  is  aimed  to  stimulate  demand  (consumer  subsidy)  and  supply  (in  response  to 
increased demand), but: 
- there is no guarantee of  place 
- it is likely that we will see the development of  nursery "chains" eg. Kinder Care. 
•  The programme allows choice for parents between providers - nursery school/class: play group; 
reception class.  Nevertheless the  amount is  sufficient for  latter,  need  for  "top up"  in  former 
(covers about half the cost) in private/voluntary sector (or use in "part-time"). 
•  Deadweight for employment which will be created anyway. 
•  Special needs are nor covered nor taken into account 
•  No means testing (more cost effective) 
•  Geographical  inequality:  the  system  does  not  take  into  account  the  cost  variations  accross 
country 
•  No funding for "set" up costs- £5 million in pilot scheme 
•  It is not out of  question to see the creation of  a secondary market in sale of  vouchers 
•  Low  professionalization:  the  training  of the  childminders  is  not  to  be  funded  (except  in 
Scotland!) 
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II 2.2.1  The Danish Home Service Scheme-
Henrik HOCHREUTER, 
Danish A~ency  for Development of  Trade and Industry (Copenha~en Denmark) 
Home Service Objectives 
The Home Service scheme is an experiment in order to establish a new market and a new trade for 
household services, and will so far be effective from  1  th of January 1994 until 31st of December 
1996. The scheme is granting direct public subsidy to all private households who acquire household 
services in their homes and gardens rendered by VAT  -registered companies. 
The purpose of  the Home Service Scheme is: 
•  to create a new market for companies in the service sector 
•  to create permanent jobs to people with no or low education 
•  to reduce the amount of  moonlighting 
•  to  convert do-it-yourself-work to  paid jobs in  order to  provide  more  spare  time to  the  busy 
families and to assist senior citizens. 
Examples of services which  are  subsidised  by the  Home  Service  scheme  are  cleaning,  grocery 
shopping, window cleaning, cooking, laundry, ironing, gardening, snow removal and other similar 
chores. The subsidised services can only be carried out by companies which was VAT-registered, 
and a company can work up to 125 hours for a three month period in the same household. 
All arrangements concerning what work is  needed, the quality of the work, the price etc is  made 
directly between the company and the consumer. 
The scheme is laid down and financed by the Danish State, the scheme is administrated by the local 
authorities. 
A new trade 
The law concerning Home Service is meant to create the background for a whole new market with 
numerous  new assignements  in  home  and  garden.  The  market  is  being  serviced both  by newly 
founded companies and by already existing companies in the service sectors. 
Until the  scheme came  into  effect,  only  very few  private  individuals  could  afford this  kind  of 
services from commercial companies. Home Service, therefore, is really a brand new trade with a 
whole new market in private households. 
The subsidy makes it possible for companies to compete with moonlighting and do-it-yourself-work. 
What does Home Service not include? 
It is  important to emphasise that Home Service is not the same as public home help.  The scheme 
does not include personal care or nursing of  the elderly, children or other family members. 
76 Who can join the Home Service Scheme? 
Home  Service  is  carried  out  by  commercial  companies  offering  to  perform  work  in  private 
households. It could be any already established company or any person interested in starting on her 
own in this new sector. Once the company has been registered under the Home Service scheme by 
the local municipality, it can perform Home Service chores in the  local area as well as  over the 
country of  Denmark. 
What are the conditions? 
Companies wanting to join the Home Service scheme must fulfil two conditions. First, the company 
must  be  VAT-registered,  and  secondly,  the  company  must  have  a  liability  insurance  covering 
damage made performing the work. If the company or the company owner will not be  accepted 
under the Home Service scheme. 
Home Service cannot be carried out by persons under the age of 18, if their work week is less than 
30 hours, and Home Service cannot be performed by people receiving national pension or a public 
salary supplement. 
What size of income are we talking about? 
The income will depend on how many hours the company is able to sell - and at which price. The 
only certainty is that the Home Service scheme releases a public subsidy of  up to DKK 85 per work-
hour. The subsidy is  1.5 times the amount paid by the customer price of DKK 50 release a subsidy 
ofDKK 75. The price paid by the customer is usually around DKK 60. 
Expenses for equipment, supplies, transportation etc. are not covered by the subsidy. 
It is important to be aware that the company must pay VAT and tax of the subsidy as well as of the 
customer's part of  the income. 
How is the subsidy paid? 
The  subsidy  is  released  on  the  basis  of a  monthly  specification  submitted  to  the  municipal 
authorities containing information about delivered Home Service work throughout the month. This 
specification must de submitted no later than 3 months after termination of  the service rendered. 
Copies of customer invoices must be enclosed with the specification, and each invoice must include 
a deduction of the public subsidy - with information about the customer's name and address, the 
type of work performed, number of working hours involved, and indication of when the tasks were 
carried out. The invoice must be signed by the customer. 
The subsidy will then be transferred directly to the company's bank. 
Information about Home Service 
HomeService was in the beginning of 1994 promoted through a broad information campaign on TV 
and  local  radio  stations as well as  advertising on buses,  and in  newspapers and magazines.  The 
objective of the campaign was to make the customers aware of the new trade, and furthermore to 
make companies market themselves as Home Service companies in their area. 
77 Every company under the Home Service scheme are private companies with responsibility for their 
own advertisement, for finding customers, and making agreements with them about the work, the 
price, etc. 
How big is the Home Service sector? 
By April 1996 approx. 4.500 companies are providing Home Service, and approx. 2.500 people are 
working full time with the Home Service Scheme. An estimate of 200.000 Danish households have 
used the scheme. The direct expense for the Danish State (total of paid subsidy) was DKK 100 mio. 
in 1994 and DKK 270 mio. in 1995. 
All segments of the Danish population are using Home Service. However the typical user is either 
double income families with senior posts and 2 or more children or senior citizens. 
40% of  the HomeService staff was previously unemployed. 
Home Service in the future 
The Danish Parliament are presently debating a new law for  HomeService which will make the 
scheme permanent. A new law will mean some change in the set up and the administration of the 
scheme. Among other things the new law will imply that the subsidy in the future amounts 50% of 
the total of the bill, and furthermore the new law will require order in the employment for people 
working in Home Service. 
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79 11.2.2.2  Job-senrice vouchers in France 
Mahrez OKBA, 
Department of  Labour - employment service (Paris, France) 
The job-service voucher scheme was  introduced on a trial basis for one year on  1 December 1996. 
Following the scheme's success in  1995, the French parliament decided to proceed with it.  The law 
passed  on  29 January 1996  concerning  job-service  vouchers,  and  on  a  more  general  level,  the 
development of personal services, broadened the scope of the scheme and removed obstacles which 
had previously hampered job creation in this sector. 
The voucher scheme was prompted by two macro-economic observations:  sluggish job growth and 
unsatisfied needs for personal services.  When the obstacles had been identified (purchasing power to 
match latent demand, need for a structure to organize supply and simplified administrative procedures) 
the scheme could be introduced. 
At the end of the  1980's efforts were focusing  on developing  "local  services".  To  this end, three 
separate developments occurred in succession. 
In  1987,  the  principle  of exemption  from  social  security  charges  was  introduced  for  the 
over-70s employing home-helps, 
followed by direct cash benefits, 
and  finally  in  1992,  tax exemption  or tax reductions,  the  scope  of which  was  gradually 
extended (consumers of"local" services are currently entitled to a reduction amounting to 50% 
of  expenditure up to a maximum ofECU 14 000). 
1.  The Voucher Scheme 
The job-service voucher scheme has three objectives:  streamlining administrative procedures. 
developing  employment activities and  combating undeclared employment.  Other branches of this 
scheme  such  as  "first  employee-vouchers",  "culture-vouchers",  "entertainment-vouchers", 
"sport-vouchers" should be regarded solely as a means of simplifying the administrative procedures 
involved in hiring employees. 
The job-service voucher system has the following two features: firstly it is an optional scheme 
which is  a  supplement to traditional domestic jobs.  What prompts private individuals to purchase 
vouchers is the benefit they derive from the simplified administrative procedures.  Secondly it places 
the parties in a mutually agreed relationship in which the employee enjoys a number of  guarantees. 
A work contract exists.  The law of  29 January 1996 extended the job-service voucher scheme 
to include jobs of more than 8 hours per week with the employer required to draw up a work 
contract (the previous scheme was restricted to 8 hours and the service-voucher was regarded 
as replacing the work contract). 
Wage nouns are imposed.  They are the minimum base and the SMIC (guaranteed minimum 
wage - FF 3  7. 72 gross hourly wage), plus 10% holiday pay for the employee. 
In  addition,  a  collective  agreement  for  domestic  employees  introduced,  with  effect  from 
1 April 1996, a 0.15% employers contribution for vocational training.  This contribution will 
serve to  establish a training fund.  Details concerning the  use of the fund  still  have to be 
determined by the parties concerned.  This contribution is part of  government policy regarding 
development of services, the aims of  which are quality of  employment, quality of service and 
professionalisation. 
81 Social rights are conferred.  In addition to social security benefits, employees are also covered 
by the collective agreement for domestic employees. 
2.  The results 
The latest assessment of  the job-service voucher scheme is as follows: 
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Post offices and banks have received 431  000 requests for membership. 
Almost 2 942 000 vouchers have been received and some 523 000  books of vouchers have 
been sent out since December 1994. 
The equivalent of  40 000 full-time jobs have been created.  On average, the work contracts in 
question are for 5 hours work per week, 87% of which are domestic jobs (mid-1995 figures). 
The gross budgetary cost of  jobs created by the scheme has been estimated at FF 5 billion. 
60% of  the vouchers were used by new employers and the remaining 40% legalised undeclared 
employment,  and  in the  same proportion traditional  arrangements  for  domestic jobs were 
transferred to a simplified administrative form. 
90% of  employers are single-income households of  which 2/3 are new users of  the scheme. 
Finally, the average wage paid by employers of  domestic staff is FF 41  (figures for first half of 
1995). 112.3  Objective "Social Management of  Unemployment" 
11.2.3.1  Local Employment Agency vouchers in Belgium-
Geor~es  CARLENS -
Ministry of  labour. Deputy Head of  Cabinet (Brussels. Belgium) 
The Local Employment Agency (LEA) voucher scheme was launched at the beginning of 1995 and has 
been introduced gradually. 
Several factors led to its introduction: 
- low  rate  of growth  of employment,  but  in  particular  the  high  number  of unskilled  long-term 
unemployed in Belgium. The numerous employment incentives such as reduced labour costs, sharing 
out of  the available work and the integration of  target groups were unsuccessful in providing work for 
all jobseekers in the short term. The Local Employment Agencies, whose aim is to integrate the long-
term unemployed, therefore  complement normal employment promotion measures; 
- unsatisfied needs in the field of  local services for natural and legal persons; 
- the desire to combat undeclared employment by directing it towards the legal market. 
1- The scheme 
The aim of these agencies, which operate at communal level,  is to put the unemployed into contact 
with private individuals and legal persons in order to carry out activities (housework, gardening, child 
minding) which are not part of  normal employment circuits. 
•  It is a system which operates at communal level: the 589 Belgian communes have to set up a 
local  employment  agency  (small  communes  may  combine)  in  the  form  of a  non-profit-making 
association, the management body of which comprises an equal number of municipal representatives 
and social partners (the three trade unions and the three employers' organisations). 
The  Board of this  non-profit-making  association  is  entrusted  with  the  task of defining  authorised 
activities  at  local  level.  There  is  also  an  official  list of services  which  are  not  likely to  generate 
competition with regular employment. 
•  Five  categories of persons  may take  advantage  of the  local  employment agencies:  private 
individuals, local authorities (communes and public centres for social assistance), non-profit-making 
associations and other non-commercial associations, teaching establishments and, finally, businesses in 
the horticultural sector, which are an exception to the rule, the scheme not being open to commercial 
businesses. 
•  The activities offered are:  for private individuals: housework, gardening, child minding, care 
of the  elderly;  local  authorities:  the  work  most  often  involves  the  upkeep  and  protection  of the 
environment; non-profit-making associations:  specific activities such as  cultural or sporting events; 
schools: activities related to school; the horticultural sector: seasonal work, particularly the harvesting 
of  fruit and vegetables. 
•  The target population of Local Employment Agencies: The aim is to integrate the long-term 
unemployed, i.e. jobseekers who have been receiving unemployment benefit for three years or more; 
people who receive such benefit even if they are no longer looking for work and, finally, those who 
earn the minimum wage. 
Apart from  the usual  support measures given to the unemployed, training has  not been given as a 
matter of  course. 
83 - However, almost 80% of  these activities are in the field of home help, which requires practically no 
special training, and the number of potential service providers (almost 150 000 unemployed) makes it 
possible to select the most skilled jobseekers in relation to demand; 
- finally,  20% of the value of the voucher in  excess of ECU  3.8  (FB  150) may also  go  towards 
financing training measures. 
•  Services: The employer may employ one or more people and receives an authorisation from 
the Agency for one year. The unemployed person, however, is not allowed to work more than 45 hours 
per month but retains his/her status as ajobseeker. 
The services are paid for in full by Local Employment Agency vouchers at a rate of between ECU 5 
and 7.5  per hour (FB  200-300). The employer is  offered a tax reduction. The maximum amount of 
expenditure is  ECU 2 000 per year (FB  80  000) and the reduction is calculated on the basis of the 
average rate of  taxation, at a minimum of30% and a maximum of  40%. 
The difference between the value of  the voucher paid by the employer (ECU 5 - 7  .5) and that received 
by the unemployed person (ECU 3  .8,  which is  added to his/her unemployment benefit and enables 
him/her to remain fully covered under the  social protection scheme) is  used to  pay for the cost of 
insuring  the  worker  and  the  Local  Employment  Agency's  administrative  costs.  The  remainder  is 
assimilated to a social contribution. 
2- Results 
At the beginning of May 1996, 555 of  the 589 communes had decided to create a Local Employment 
Agency. Altogether, 464 Local Employment Agencies are now in operation. 
According to a survey carried out in January 1996, 42  129  people had made use of LEA vouchers, 
providing work for 24 224 long-term unemployed since the system was introduced. 
For the month of January  1996, an  average of 14  877 unemployed people were working almost 25 
hours. 
A total of 5 250 000  vouchers have  been issued,  of which 80% have been for  private individuals, 
mainly for housework. 
A qualitative and quantitative assessment is under way with a view to improving the scheme. 
84 11.2.3 2  The  prQject  in  the  Netherlands:  market  expansion  in  the  cleaning  industry  -
Marjolein PETERS, 
ElM Small Business Research and Consultancy. (Zoetermeer. Netherland) 
Since  a  few  years,  the  government has  been  studying  and  discussing  the  possibilities  to  create 
employment in personal services. This new reflection was, among others, stimulated by the White 
Paper about Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. 
In the Netherlands there are several local projects where long term unemployed people are put into 
personal  service jobs.  In  addition,  a  system  exists  in  the  Health-care  sector,  which  intends  to 
restructure the supply of  home care services. Patients that need caring for at home now are alloted a 
sum of money which they spend with any institution they like. Previously, such care was provided 
by the traditional institutions in this field. 
Together  with  some  other  measures  an  experimental  national  scheme,  aimed  to  stimulate  the 
demand for personal services, has been introduced on 1st June 1996. However, it is not a voucher 
system. 
This device is the result of  the conclusions of  several studies : 
- there is a very high latent demand for domestic work 
-almost 250 000  households which were until now employing people in the black or grey sector 
would  be  willing  to  legalise  personal  services  (provided  there  is  some  sort  of system  that 
compensates for the higher cost). 
- People would be interested in a system like the service vouchers for child care, domestic services, 
window cleaning and minor maintenance work in and around houses. 
The Ministry of  Social Affairs and Employment chose the cleaning industry for two reasons: 
- the high demand of  households for such services. 
- the employers and the social partners in this sector who were  looking for ways to increase the 
number of  jobs in this sector. (Nowadays, cleaning firms are providing 
services for firms and companies but not so much for households because they find it too expensive 
to enter into this market). 
1-The experimental project in the cleaning industry: 
•  Three cities have been chosen ( Rotterdam,  Eindhoven,  Arnhem) and the experimental project 
will  be  developed  in  co-operation with  regional  employment services,  local  social  services  and 
social partners (especially the employers federation in the cleaning industry). 
The consumers concerned are only residents but the companies can come from any other city. 
• The main aims of  this project are: 
- to expand the market of  cleaning firms by creating a market amongst private households 
- and secondly to create job opportunities for long-term unemployed. 
• Design of  the project: 
It is called an experimental project at least for the first six months and only in the cleaning industry 
for the moment.What is typical and different about this project in the Netherlands is  that the idea 
was to subsidise activities or services for private households. 
85 However, instead of giving vouchers or money to the households, it has been decided to subsidise 
firms  who are  going to  supply households  with  services. It is  a wage  cost subsidy enabling the 
companies to offer their services at a price comparable to  the  black market prices which  in the 
Netherlands are about 7.5 ECU per hour. They are giving the same services to companies but they 
have to charge them the normal rate. 
At the same time the cleaning companies have to stimulate a demand for these services.  They have 
to go out to the households and make sure that they are hired. They have to provide a high quality 
service and ensure that people can trust the person who is going to clean their house. 
The fact people hesitate to employ a company also came out of the study.  There are going to be a 
number of initiatives in this branch of the industry to ensure that it is becoming more popular and 
more attractive to hire a company as a household.  This also means that the role of the Employers 
Federation in this sector is going to be important and that they are going to inform companies about 
this new subsidy. 
However, employers only receive a subsidy: 
- if  they provide these services to households and 
- if they hire a long-term unemployed for at least one year and at least 32 hours per week (it has to 
be an official contract). 
These employees receive wages no  higher than  120  % of the national minimum wage  level.  This 
also  means that the  employers who join this  project are  going to  receive  two  other wages  cost 
subsidies.  One  is  for  hiring the long-term  unemployed.  Any employer will  receive a subsidy for 
employing people  at a low wage  level  which  is  another measure  to  reintegrate people with  low 
skills. 
Employers are qualified for the maximum amount of subsidy if  they are on production of consumer 
contracts for 32 hours per week. 
2- The evaluation 
As it is a new project, there is no evaluation of results but a monitoring and evaluation system with 
this project will be carried out very intensively. 
One of the major questions is whether there is a permanent demand for this type of service or if it 
will be still necessary to subsidise it. 
The  second question  is  to  know  if long  term  unemployed are  best re-integrated  into  the  labour 
market by giving the subsidy to employers and by making very harsh conditions for them in this 
respect. 
The final  question concerns the whole  organisation and  this  will  be  one of the more  interesting 
points  in  the  evaluation.  Introducing  a  service  voucher  is  seen  as  leading  to  an  increase  of 
administrative complications and costs in the Netherlands. The question is to know whether working 
through companies  and  stimulating the  demand amongst households through these  companies  is 
more efficient. 
86 11.3  National projects and proposals for improvement of  the existing schemes 
113.1  Job-service invoices in France-
Mahrez OKBA, 
Department of  Labour - employment service (Paris, France) 
Coinciding  with  the  implementation  of the  law  of 29 January 1996,  a  whole  series  of initiatives 
regarding the introduction of service invoices have been announced as a follow-up to the BAILLY 
report presented to the Economic and Social Council on 11 January 1996 (the vouchers are similar to 
luncheon vouchers). 
The job-service invoices is a means of payment, issued by a specialist organization (the issuer).  It 
allows an  individual (the user) to pay for a service provided by an authorized service provider (an 
association or company), with financial assistance from a local authority ("contributing third party"). 
The  law of 29 January 1996  stipulates that assistance  from  joint consultative  committees (comites 
d'entreprise  ),  or in the absence of such a committee, assistance from companies themselves, will be 
exempt from both social security charges and tax on salaries up to a maximum of  ECU 15 5 per month 
(FF 1 000).  It qualifies for the "family help" tax reduction if it is included in the beneficiary's taxable 
income.  These vouchers thus put effective purchasing power behind demand for such services. 
Job-service  invoices will be  issued  by organizations which must be  authorized  by  interministerial 
order.  Specifications setting out physical and security-related characteristics will be annexed to the 
order (appropriate accounting arrangements,  specific  bank or post office  account,  certain financial 
guarantees, etc.). 
A job-service invoice board will be  responsible  for  supervising the  issuers  in accordance with the 
specifications set out. 
The job-service  invoices  must  satisfy  common technical  standards  regardless  of the  issuer.  The 
vouchers include a logo (employment-service voucher) and a standard background colour (orange). 
Apart from the logo, each issuer may customize the remaining part of  the voucher as he wishes. 
Finally, invoices are at "face" value: The voucher's value will be agreed by contract between the issuer 
(the administering financial institution) and the payer (comite d'entreprise or company). 
How the  scheme operates:  The  invoice  is  issued  by an  authorized  issuer to a  payer.  The payer 
distributes the invoices against all or part of  the nominal invoice value as he wishes.  The beneficiaries 
hand over the invoices to the authorized service providers in return for their services.  The service 
providers may then redeem the invoices at authorized issuers within a minimum time limit of  21  days. 
Once the trial being carried out in the thirteen participating departements has ended (probably the end 
of September 1996), the  scheme will  be  evaluated.  The objective of this  is  to put forward  other 
changes prior to the implementation of  the scheme nationwide. 
87 113.2  The Proximus Experiment: Mass Stimulation Of Demand To  Boost The Emergence Of 
The Local Services Sector in France -
Michele DEBONNEUIL, Debonneui/, 
Director of  Economic and Financial Studies Service, Indosuez Bank (Paris,  France) 
The "local services" sector is the only source of  new jobs which has real potential. Under the auspices 
of  the CNPF (French National Employers' Council), it has made a decisive breakthrough on the supply 
side with the creation of an association of companies within the sector.  The association is there to 
ensure that supply is of  a nature to guarantee the sector the long-term viability of  which it is capable. 
However, lack of  liquidity on the demand side is still a stumbling block to the further development of 
the local services sector. For the moment, then, until it has become fully established, it needs to be 
stimulated artificially. The purpose of this note is to present a mechanism through which this can be 
achieved. 
This mechanism has the further advantage of being financially neutral. Far from putting an additional 
burden  on the  State,  it operates  by reimbursing  employees  part of their unemployment  insurance 
contributions,  on  condition  that  they  are  used  to  purchase  local  services.  Obviously,  such 
reimbursement  is  dependent  on  approval  by  Unedic,  i.e.  the  social  partners,  trade  unions  and 
employers. The agreement of  the two trade unions so far consulted (CFDT and CFTC, which represent 
the majority of  the unions) has been obtained. 
As from  1 January 1997, this project will be run on an experimental basis in two departements in the 
Paris area and probably in one provincial departement. A dozen or so companies, which are or will be 
members of the new association of firms offering services to private households, will participate. All 
the companies involved will be of  proven quality (Darty, subsidiaries of  the CDC (Caisse des Depots et 
Consignations) and ofLyonnaise des Eaux, etc.). 
Moving on to the mechanism proper, a concrete description of  how the experiment will operate will be 
of  far more value than a long treatise. 
A dozen companies will offer a range of services in the departements concerned, for which they will 
need to take on x job-seekers. Prior to recruitment,  these new employees will have  been drawing 
Unedic unemployment benefit amounting to X francs per month  18. As it will no longer be responsible 
for paying unemployment benefit to these persons, Unedic will be in a position to reimburse the sum X 
to then households in the departement involved in the experimentl9. To this end, each household will 
receive a monthly payment of X/n ECU into a special "services account"20,  which it will only be 
possible to withdraw in order to purchase services. 
As  for  any  other activity,  each  company  must  price  the  proposed  services  on the  basis  of cost, 




X is the total of  the unemployment benefit Xi paid to the x new employees prior to their recruitment. No 
attempt is made here to go into the complexities of the mechanism created by the fact that the benefit 
paid by Unedic  is  on  a  sliding  scale  and  is,  after  a  certain  time,  superseded  by the  occupational 
integration minimum income paid by the State. 
Those concerned may be either employees or the whole of the working population, given that after a 
certain time the benefit paid to  the  unemployed becomes a welfare benefit (occupational integration 
minimum income) fmanced by the taxpayer. There would be little point in entering into any debate on 
this question at this stage. 
For the trial period, the "services account" will be managed by SO  FIN  CO (fmancial institution). 
89 the person concerned prior to recruitment,  either because the  benefit was  lower than the minimum 
wage, or because the employer considers it necessary to pay more than the minimum wage, e.g. to 
ensure that the job-seeker accepts the  post offered. Either way,  only the  amount equivalent to the 
unemployment benefit X is payable from the services account (which will have been credited with the 
same amount, as stated above). The remaining costs and profit are payable from the consumer's own 
pocket.  Initial  calculations  based  on  Unedic  information  suggest  that  the  proportion  of the  cost 
redeemable in this way will range from 50% to 100% depending on the service21. 
This mechanism can be implemented until the jobs created have absorbed all those seeking work, apart 
from  the  long-term  unemployed  (the  reintegration  of whom  would  probably  require  specific 
arrangements  which are  no doubt  already  in  existence and  for  whom  the applicable  benefit - the 
occupational integration minimum income - is too far removed from  the minimum growth wage to 
allow the affordability criterion to be met) and those in  "frictional" unemployment, who are essential 
for the labour market to function normally. As a result of  the process, jobs would be found for a third 
of  job-seekers, particularly those who would not have found work without this kind of help. Thus it 
will be possible to refund around a third of  total unemployment insurance contributions to employees, 
i.e. the total of  their contributions, while the other two-thirds continue to finance those in long-term and 
frictional unemployment. 
The  result  should  be  increased  growth,  particularly  in  terms  of jobs.  The  trend  towards  more 
consumption of local  services  set in  motion through this  mechanism  should  gather momentum  as 
consumer awareness increases. Having seen the benefits available to them at low cost, consumers will 
realise  that it  is  time to  stop  doing  certain jobs for  themselves  when the  same  service  is  readily 
available on the market. 
21 
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The range of services is segmented, certain products targeting the less well-off population groups being 
100% redeemable (these groups will also be able to claim more on their services account than will the 
more affluent groups), and other, profit-making, products targeting the better-off groups. 113.3  New jobs in private households in Germany -
Outline  plan  devised  by  Dr.  habil.  Maria  Bohmer,  Member  of  the  German  Bundestag, 
presented by Claudia HASSENBACH (academic assistant), (Bonn, Germany) 
1.  Current situation 
Only 36.000 out of  a total of  some 36 million households in Germany employ domestic staff subject to 
social-insurance  contributions;  this  represents  1  °/oo  of all  households.  The  great majority  of these 
domestic employees are either employed on a small scale (732 000), i.e. their earnings are below the 
threshold at which cover under health-, pension-, nursing-care and unemployment-insurance schemes 
is  provided,  or  they  work  illicitly.  (Most  women  in  small-scale  employment  are  nevertheless 
automatically  covered  by  their  husbands'  health-insurance  scheme  without  having  to  pay  any 
contributions). There are no precise figures for the number of people working illicitly in households, 
but they are almost certainly very high. 
In 1992 the total number of  people engaged in small-scale employment in Germany was approximately 
4.5 million. Those in employment but not subject to social-insurance contributions accounted for 9% of 
the total labour force. The scale of  this type of  employment, which was originally intended as a special 
arrangement introduced by the government in  order to allow flexibility  in  responding to temporary 
peaks in demand for  labour and cyclical  or seasonal fluctuations  in  the volume of work,  has  now 
reached the critical point, and this is to the detriment of  the social-insurance schemes and those paying 
contributions. 
A breakdown of sectors of economic activity in the old federal  states (i.e. what was formerly West 
Germany) reveals that private households are the main employers of  those in small-scale employment, 
accounting  for  28%.  In the  period  from  1987  to  1992,  the  increase  in  the  number of persons  in 
employment not subject to social-insurance contributions who were working in  private households 
was, at 28%, around twice the level for this type of  employment as a whole (approx. 14.5%). Over 90% 
of  all those working in private households are women. 
Almost all employment in private households is therefore in a "grey area" covering illicit work and 
small-scale employment. Because of  the principle of  the inviolability of  the home which is enshrined in 
the German Constitution, however, the means available to prevent abuse of employment law, such as 
the  requirement that workers  be  in  possession of a  social-security card,  are  ineffective  as  regards 
employment in private households. 
Domestic  employment  suffers  from  a  poor  image  resulting  from  a  combination  of unfavourable 
employment conditions on the one hand and being decried as "working as a maid" on the other. Given 
that those working illicitly or in small-scale employment can undercut trained domestic employees as 
regards  rates  of pay,  the  latter  have  great  difficulty  in  finding  a  job  in  which  social-insurance 
contributions are payable. This makes the occupation unattractive to newcomers. 
In view of the high level of unemployment affecting, among others, low-skilled workers and women 
wishing to rejoin the labour market after having started/brought up a family, jobs in private households, 
with normal conditions of  employment, is an area which should be developed further. 
At the same time, considerable demand for domestic services can, under appropriate conditions, be 
expected  in  Germany.  In  the  field  of services,  Germany  is  still  lagging  behind  other  western 
industrialised countries. 
2.  The need for action 
91 Any attempt to increase the level of employment in private households and make it more attractive 
must take account of  the special nature of  this type of  employment. 
The structure of employment in this area is  unusual in that most domestic employees work 
only a small number of hours.  Only if these hours are  combined and job-pools created (in 
service centres, for example) will it be possible to bring about "normal" part-time and full-time 
employment (i.e. subject to social-insurance contributions) to any significant degree. 
It  must  be  assumed  that  an  extremely  high  proportion  of illicit  work  and  small-scale 
employment remains unaffected by measures to prevent abuse of statutory provisions because 
of the  principle of inviolability of the home which  is  enshrined  in  the Constitution.  Legal 
employment in private households, especially that in which social-insurance contributions are 
paid, will only gain wide acceptance if it is not substantially more expensive than other forms 
of  employment. 
The obligations  on employers,  such  as  drawing  up  salary statements,  registration  with the 
social-insurance  institutions  and  other insurance  cover,  often make  too  many demands  on 
private  individuals  employing  domestic  staff.  Older  people  in  particular  have  problems. 
Procedures are needed which are as straightforward as possible. 
The poor image of domestic employment must be overcome. This would firstly improve the 
standing of domestic employees, and secondly would make it easier for private individuals to 
take on such staff. The many untrained workers could be given training opportunities. This 
would also result in the quality of  work in private households being maintained and improved. 
Jobs  in  private  households  subject to  social-insurance  contributions  can  therefore  only be 
created to any significant extent by means of  tax incentives and unbureaucratic procedures. A 
new approach is therefore needed. 
If  attempts to turn private households into normal places of  work are successful, it may be assumed that 
the increasing number of  old people who are forced to rely on outside help, the increase in the number 
of households in which both partners work, and the large number of single parents would lead, under 
appropriate conditions, to greater demand for domestic staff. 
The Institute for the German Economy (lnstitut der deutschen  Wirtschaft)  in  Cologne believes that 
under favourable  conditions,  some 870 000 full- and part-time jobs in  private households could be 
created. This would provide opportunities for low-skilled workers, who could be taught or trained to do 
this work. 
3.  Proposed solutions 
In order to create jobs with social-insurance  cover,  the  following  "three-pronged"  proposal  should 
therefore be implemented: 
1.  Arrangements should be made which allow costs incurred in employing domestic staff to be 
fully tax-deductible. This must be made subject to social-insurance contributions being paid 
for the person employed. 
2.  The establishment of "service centres"  must be  promoted throughout Germany.  This could 
enable "mini-jobs" with several employers to be combined to constitute full- or part-time jobs 
with  social-insurance  cover.  The  employees  would  enjoy  social-security  cover  and  the 
employers could benefit from tax breaks. 
3.  It should be examined whether the French service-voucher scheme could be transferred to 
Germany to provide a simplified procedure for furnishing proof of  having worked. 
92 4.  Progress in implementing the pro_posals 
In its coalition agreement for the 13th legislative period, the German Government undertook to make 
employment in private households more a part of  the normal jobs market and to provide for more tax 
breaks in this connection. 
The German Government and the parties of  the governing coalition (CDU/CSU and FDP) have now set 
out these aims in detail: 
a.  The German Government's action programme for investment and jobs of  31 Jaouar.y 1996 
"In  private  households,  there  is  a  great  need,  which  will  increase  in  the  future,  for  family- and 
household-related services. The potential for creating new jobs with social-insurance cover must be 
exploited. To this end, the Government will provide for opportunities to improve conditions and ease 
the burden of administrative requirements on private households as employers (e.g.  by simplifying 
procedures  for  the  payment of social-insurance  contributions).  Tax breaks will  also  be offered to 
increase  the  number of people  in  employment  in  private  households.  Detailed  proposals  will  be 
submitted by the middle of 1996." 
b.  Programme for more growth and employment drawn up the CDUICSU and FDP grouping in 
the Bundestag on 25 April 1996 
"The tax arrangements as regards employment in private households will be improved. The scope of 
the tax allowance for special expenses will be broadened by doing away with the previously applicable 
conditions for their deductibility (i.e.  two children,  one child under ten years of age with a  single 
parent, or a person in the household requiring constant attendance). Arrangements for the deduction of 
wage-tax and social-insurance contributions will be simplified. The previous ceiling ofDM 12 000 will 
be doubled to DM 24 000." 
These aims  are  currently being  implemented under the  1997  Annual  Tax Act (Jahressteuergesetz 
1997). The introduction of a simplified procedure, based on the French service-voucher scheme, for 
furnishing proof  of  having worked is also being considered. 
c.  "Service centre" pilot project 
On 1 April,  1996, the first "service centre" pilot project promoted by the Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs was launched in Frankenthal (Rhineland-Palatinate). Funds totalling around DM 1 
million are being made available for three years to provide start-up financing. The project is being run 
jointly by the German Housewives'  Association (Deutscher  Haus.frauenbund)  and the Frankenthal 
Youth Workshop (Jugendwerkstatt Frankenthal). In addition to a manager, managing clerk and office 
worker, between five and ten people work in the centre for periods of between 18  and 38.5 hours a 
week. As well as offering help with matters concerning housekeeping and providing domestic staff, the 
range of  services offered by the centre includes counselling and advice for families. 
The general idea is that private households should be able to approach the centre with enquiries about 
domestic  services.  The  centre  vouches  for  the  quality  and  reliability  of the  people  it  places  in 
households. At the same time, private employers are relieved of the burden of having to deal with 
formalities such as salary statements, registration with social-insurance institutions, and accident and 
liability insurance. Replacement staff  are provided on request for periods during which the employee is 
on holiday or sick-leave. 
For the domestic employees themselves, the advantage of the service centre is that they have lasting 
employment with social-insurance cover. They enter into employment contracts providing for wages 
which they can live on and which allow them to make some provision for their old age. Women can 
thus build up their own social-security entitlements. The service centre ensures that statutory rights, 
such as entitlement to continued payment of  wages during sick-leave or holidays, are in fact respected. 
93 The employees are not penalised for any periods during which they have no work or any time spent 
travelling. 
In addition to creating jobs, another employment-policy aim is being pursued, namely to reintegrate 
into the jobs market women who left it to start/bring up a family, and to place women in employment 
who have been unemployed for a long time or are difficult to place in jobs. Alongside placement in 
jobs, training  opportunities  are  also  offered:  during  periods  when  they  are  not  on  hire  to  private 
households,  women can  acquire  additional  qualifications  on modular training courses.  In addition, 
flexibility in working hours can be arranged with the employees so that they can also see to the needs 
of  their families. 
This scheme is in the nature of  a pilot project. The experience gained is to be used to set up a network 
of service centres throughout Germany. The scheme also gives women in particular the chance to set 
up in business on their own. 
94 1!3.4  Thecreation of  jobs in the personal services sector-
Christophe SALMON-
National Council of  French Employers, CNPF (Paris,  France) 
1.  Main obstacles to the development of  personal services 
Following a report adopted by the CNPF  in April  1994, the services liaison committee (an internal 
body of the  CNPF  which  coordinates  40  federations  in  the  services  industry)  identified the  main 
obstacles to the development of  jobs in personal services in France as: 
the attitude that unemployment should be dealt with by the social security system; 
the very wide range of demands made by households and overcompartmentalization in the 
supply of  services. 
Nowadays the requirements of  families are based not on a specific demand for services (cleaning, child 
minding or help for the elderly, for example) but on the quest for a better quality of  family life. Thus a 
response must be made to a set of  concerns which must be addressed as a whole. 
While  the  problem  of unlocking  demand  remains  the  main  obstacle  to  the  development of these 
services, the difficulties related to more subjective factors, such as the behaviour of  households, require 
the attention of  the public authorities (guaranteeing the standard of service provided and removing the 
psychological reluctance of  households to employ staff from outside their homes). 
Market research done  by Demoscopie and  published at the  end of May  1996  made  it possible to 
analyse household demand for these new services in France: 
50% of  households who have requirements find a way of  satisfying them. 
Over half of  this 50% are dissatisfied with the supply of  services but have no alternative. 
25% of households have requirements which they cannot find a way of satisfying because of 
qualitative criteria such as qualifications. 
What households tend to want is a guaranteed standard of  service and the majority of  them do not want 
any personal relationship with the service provider. 
2.  Proposals by the CNPF 
The development of services to private individuals is  not only part of the move towards a cohesive 
economy and the fostering of  social relations. For the CNPF, it is a matter of  creating a new economic 
sector like that which has been achieved with services to firms; twenty years ago these were looked on 
as a "sub-area" of  activities (for example, collective catering and cleaning services). 
With regard to supply and demand, the 1994 report proposes unlocking demand by households 
rather than subsidizing supply by operators in the voluntary and non-profit sector. 
The  services  committee  also  proposed  that  "multi-services  vouchers"  modelled  on  the 
restaurant meal  voucher system  be  introduced.  This  proposal  was  included  in  the  law  of 
January 1996 of  which the implementing decrees have not yet been published. 
Another course of  action to remove the obstacles to the development of  personal services, and 
one which will probably be looked at in the next few years, would involve reducing the VAT 
rate. 
95 3.  Outlook 
The trade association for personal services firms was set up in June 1995; it brings together the main 
service  providers  (including  Lyonnaise  des  eaux,  Generate  des  eaux,  Accor  and  some  insurance 
companies and supplementary pension funds) which work on what are called business plans. 
The grounds for setting up the trade association are as follows: 
the fact that the market has so far mainly been the preserve of the voluntary and non-profit 
sector; 
the wish to have an effective representative in dealings with officialdom; 
the determination of  businesses to overcome the cultural obstacles to the consumption of such 
services by households (anxiety about having their privacy intruded on, and the need for an 
organization to guarantee the standard of  service). 
The aim is to develop personal services substantially over the next three years by: 
conferring a  seal  of approval  on the  supply of services  by  introducing (in addition to the 
approval  procedure  brought  in  by  the  1996  law)  procedures  for  the  certification  and 
recognition of  the professional qualifications of  businesses, to be monitored by an independent 
body, 
drafting a system of references for occupations and  training in  conjunction with the social 
partners involved. If  the market develops as planned, a special collective agreement covering 
new services could be drawn up. 
The job-service invoice scheme which is going to be introduced in France is a fundamental aspect of 
the task of  reactivating social dialogue by highlighting the role of  the works councils and by providing 
more material for negotiations over pay. 
It is therefore vital that the CNPD should give an impetus to the development of  the scheme by raising 
awareness among works councils and Human Resources Directorates in the large and medium-sized 
companies. 
96 11.4  Conclusions and synthesis -
Marjorie JOUEN, 
Forward Studies Unit, European Commission 
This  seminar  on  consumption  subsidies  and  service  vouchers  was  part  of the  follow  up  to  the 
Commission  Communication  on  a  European  strategy  for  encouraging  local  development  and 
employment initiatives22. 
The main aim of the day was to pool detailed information on existing or planned measures in EU 
Member States and to pinpoint the conditions needed to make such policies fully effective.  Although 
the meeting was very short, there were very constructive exchanges of experience and discussions that 
shed further light on the financial engineering that can be used to create jobs in local services. 
By way of  summary, four lessons can be drawn from the papers and discussions: 
The service voucher is  a  potentially sophisticated  financial  instrument but is  under-
exploited because adequate financial engineering is lacking.  The service voucher could be backed 
up by systems ensuring the quality of  jobs and services (training, accreditation, etc.). Public financial 
assistance could also be modulated to meet the concern for equity (tax exemptions, progressive co-
financing based on income or degree of  disability, etc.). 
In most cases, however, little has been made of this potential: back-up systems are very rudimentary 
and the service vouchers currently in circulation are no more than simple exchange vouchers.  This can 
be seen, however, as a temporary situation which is likely to change, bearing in mind that such systems 
have been launched only recently in a number of  countries.  Were this not to be the case, we have to be 
aware  of the  risk  of malfunction,  i.e.  the  service  voucher would  be  seen  as  further  evidence  of 
increased bureaucracy. 
The service voucher (or other forms of consumption subsidy) seems at present to be the 
instrument most suited to ensuring the development of new markets and durable jobs, as it is 
targeted directly  at potential  consumers.  By targeting  sectors  in  which the  supply  is  low  and/or 
artificially  limited  (public  sector  monopoly)  and  demand  is  yet  to  become  focused  (new  needs 
connected with demographic, family and occupational changes) it is possible to reduce windfall effects 
Gobs created in any case), substitution effects (replacement of  one type of recruitment by another) and 
competition effects (interference with the existing supply). 
This analysis is borne out by the fact that many systems, whose main objective is to improve the 
quality of life and diversify households' choices, have met with rapid success among consumers and 
have recorded "spontaneous" net job creation in respect of20 to 50% of  the supply. 
The service voucher is no more than a financial instrument and cannot claim to replace 
an employment policy.  There is a real risk that a second labour market will be created and local 
services permanently downgraded if  the system is not backed up by a training and qualification policy 
for unemployed people and a guarantee of  the quality of  working conditions and the services provided 
(see, for instance, the current problems in the USA in the domestic work sector). For these reasons, 
many misgivings about the Belgian and British schemes were voiced during the discussions. 
Service vouchers allow the public authorities to play a new social and economic role. The 
conditions  under which  schemes  are  being  implemented  show  that  new  supervisory  methods  are 
becoming more widespread. Most Member States have chosen to carry out one- or two-year trials in a 
22 COM (95) 273 (OJ of 12.10.95 C/265/03). 
97 limited area before placing schemes on a general footing.  They have made provision for evaluations at 
an early stage (the Finnish and Danish systems are probably the most sophisticated). 
In some cases the system is managed by public (national and local level) and private (participation by 
enterprises and consumers in financial and administrative management) partnerships. 
The decision to launch these policies is more often the result of an attempt to stimulate and develop 
than to provide direct assistance. 
Few Members States have, however, a clear vision of the issues connected with the "marketing" of 
domestic work and home help services. While the divide between what was supplied by the State and 
what came from the private sector remained more or less stable for 50 years, the boundary is becoming 
blurred and shifting, offering scope for the private sector and associations.  The constant growth of 
expenditure  on  services  compared  with  the  relative  stagnation  of purchases  of capital  goods  or 
foodstuffs is, moreover, attracting the private sector and making it more willing to start to diversify or 
redeploy activities. Possible arbitration by the public authorities to ensure that the most disadvantaged 
have access to high quality services is not at present very explicit. 
In the light of recent changes affecting our social organisations and our welfare States, it is  surely 
premature to claim that we can answer all the questions. 
This seminar highlighted what can be gained from  an informal European meeting of researchers and 
those responsible for social policy.  But we have to acknowledge that in one day many topics were 
skimmed over.  This initial contact needs to be continued and consolidated at future seminars. 
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